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I.H.S.

# THOUGHTS

ON

# TRADE IN GENERAL,

OUR

# WEST-INDIAN IN PARTICULAR,

OUR

# CONTINENTAL COLONIES,

CANADA, GUADALOUPE,

AND THE

# PRELIMINARY ARTICLES

OF

# PEACE.

ADDRESSED to the COMMUNITY.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN WILKIE, at the Bible in St. Paul's Church-yard.

MDCCLXIII.

[Price One Shilling and Six-pence.]

S12.042
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1972

Illinois
Natural
History

TO THE

# COMMUNITY.

RIGHT notions of commercial connections are of the utmoſt importance to a trading nation; and the fallacy of arguments tending to miſlead it, whether adopted thro' weakneſs or deſign, ought to be detected e'er the public hath fixed it's opinion, and thereby become a *party* inſtead of remaining a *judge*. Such arguments abound in the *examination of the commercial principles of the late negotiation*, &c. *in* 1761, as I ſhall endeavour to ſhow in the following pages, with as much brevity as is conſiſtent with the ſubjects to be handled.

The plain deſign of the *Examiner* is to ſecure *Guadaloupe*. This leads him to ſpeak of our trade to the *Weſt-Indies* and our continental colonies, to leſſen the value of *Canada*, to inſiſt upon the importance of his favourite iſles, and to cenſure the late negotiation on account of *that's* being to be reſtored, which he very weakly endeavours to ſhow, and hopes he hath fully demon-

ſtrated, *to be far ſuperior in value to every thing we ſhould have acquired by that treaty* *.

The *Examiner* is mightily for arguing from *facts*. Though I ſhall not confine myſelf wholly to this method, I ſhall attempt doing it, ſo far as to verify his own words, viz. *A diſpaſſionate reader, when furniſhed with the proper facts, may form a ſyſtem for himſelf. By his temper he may counteract the paſſions, and ſupply the deficiencies of his author; and whilſt he is enabled to correct his miſtakes, he will ſometimes deduce from his facts a chain of conſequences, which may poſſibly have eſcaped the writer, who originally furniſhed him with the materials of ſpeculation* †.

Let us for a while range our thoughts under the following heads, TRADE in general, our WEST-INDIAN in particular, our CONTINENTAL COLONIES, CANADA, GUADALOUPE.

A miſtake in the foundation, runs through the whole ſuperſtructure; and if the firſt principles are not right, the inferences, tho' drawn ever ſo fairly, will prove inconcluſive. It is of conſequence then, that, in treating of any particular branches of commerce, we ſhould have juſt conceptions of TRADE in general.

Trade, as a mean, is the chief ſupport of our independency. *Great-Britain* is ſituated near a nation, whoſe ambition, if ſeconded by a ſufficient power, would ſoon prove fatal to our religion and

* See p. 17, 56, 67. † P. 7.

liberties.



liberties. The ſmallneſs of our country, compared with *France*, is no diſadvantage to us; but the ſmallneſs of our numbers. Were our inhabitants as numerous as thoſe of *France*, we ſhould derive an advantage from the ſmallneſs of our Iſland, as we ſhould be better able to defend its coaſts, than if as large again. But as we fall ſhort of *France* in numbers, the ſecurity that we thereby loſe muſt be made up by the ſuperiority of our navy. The number of our inhabitants, and the ſtrength of our navy added to each other, muſt put us upon a par with the *French*; and then the circumſtance of our being an Iſland will give us a ſufficient ſecurity againſt all hoſtile attempts from that ambitious people. Upon the ſuppoſition that we increaſed in populouſneſs much more in proportion than the *French*, the ſtrength of our navy might be decreaſed without danger, in the ſame degree as the ſtrength of the inhabitants was increaſed; but if on the other hand the ſuperior ſtrength of our navy ſhould increaſe with the growing ſtrength of the inhabitants, our ſecurity is greatly promoted: and this is what may be naturally expected; however as the increaſe of inhabitants will not weaken our navy, and adds ſtrength to the community, hence it appears of what importance it is to increaſe them, which ſhould be done by removing as much as poſſible all thoſe obſtacles to matrimony by which numbers are kept ſingle, and by encouraging ſuch foreigners to ſettle among us, whoſe good behaviour we can rely upon. But then, as

it is not merely numbers that conſtitutes the ſtrength of a community, but alſo the ſubordination of ſuch numbers, their virtue, health and valour; and as theſe numbers will gradually decreaſe when the means of ſupporting themſelves fail, and can be increaſed no longer than while ſuch means continue, they muſt of neceſſity have ſome employment. This employment we may call TRADE; whenever it furniſhes one individual with ſomething that he exchanges with another, whether it conſiſts in growing corn or in procuring furs. I am ſenſible that I uſe the word in a larger ſenſe than common; as well as a different one, not for the *exchange* itſelf, but the *employ* belonging to ſuch exchange: however, as the good ariſing to a trading nation ſprings not ſo much from the *exchange* itſelf as the *employ*, I ſhall think myſelf juſtified in uſing the word *Trade* as now mentioned.

Having cleared the way thus far, I go on to obſerve, that a ſmall part of a large community being able to grow and get in order corn ſufficient for the ſupport of the whole, and to raiſe all other neceſſaries, which they will conſider as their own property being procured by their own labours, the other part of the community muſt be employed in obtaining ſomething to give in exchange; and whenever by reaſon of circumſtances the poorer ſort of people find it extremely difficult or next to impoſſible to procure by their induſtry, wherewithal to make an exchange for the neceſſaries, and ſome of the conveniencies of life, they are diſcouraged



couraged from entering into the married ſtate, and the populouſneſs of the community decreaſes. 'Tis neceſſary for the health, ſafety, and growth of the body politic, that there ſhould be a mutual dependance between the ſeveral parts of it, owing to their different wants, inclinations and the like; and that this dependance ſhould give employment to the whole. Where a nation is ſo extremely populous, as that it hath nothing to fear from neighbouring ſtates, a trade within itſelf ſufficient to give it full employ, will be all that is neceſſary; and if it hath only a home trade, gold and ſilver are not wanted to carry it on, any thing elſe may be ſubſtituted in the room of it, and an imaginary value be ſtampt upon it, giving it a currency among the inhabitants of ſuch nation. We have an inſtance of this ſort among the *Lacedæmonians* by order of their noted lawgiver *Lycurgus*.

If a navy is neceſſary to the ſecuring of a ſtate, then a trade with foreign parts becomes neceſſary, as what home trade may be carried on coaſtwiſe by ſhipping, will not ſuffice for the ſupport of ſuch navy. Let this foreign trade be good, and the larger it is the better, if carried on by your own ſhips and ſeamen, otherwiſe you are ſtrengthening the navy of another ſtate. Should this foreign trade be carried on with other ſtates; you muſt adopt ſentiments anſwerable to theirs, reſpecting gold and ſilver as the moſt valuable commodities to be bartered away for others, and muſt be careful

ful to have ſuch ſupplies of them, as to be able therewith to command from foreign markets whatever is wanted towards your own ſafety; whenever the ſeller will not be paid in other commodities, or only to ſuch a proportion. The balance of trade is ſaid to be in our favour, whenever the goods we ſend to foreign markets are more valuable than what we receive, ſo that we have a difference paid us in gold or ſilver; but whenever the goods imported from a foreign market are more in value than the goods exported to the ſame, ſo that there is a difference which we are obliged to make up in gold or ſilver, the balance is againſt us. This balance of trade may be againſt us, and yet not be really prejudicial to us; as the goods for which we pay our caſh, may be exported with a profit upon them, for ſuch uſeful commodities as we ſhould otherwiſe have paid caſh for. If indeed the goods for which we pay caſh are not exported, and yet are no ways neceſſary to the ſafety of the community; or are not exported for ſuch commodities as are neceſſary, but for ſuch as we ſhould have done full as well or better without, then the balance of trade is prejudicial as well as againſt us, unleſs the number of ſhips and ſailors employed in ſuch trade ſhould be ſo conſiderable as to anſwer for ſuch balance. In reaſonings of this kind there is nothing like illuſtration by known objects, to give the reader that ideas of what you are about. I will therefore illuſtrate what I have advanced, by the *Eaſt-India* trade.

The



The balance of trade to the *Eaſt Indies* is much againſt us, ſo that there are yearly conſiderable exports of bullion, however it does not neceſſarily follow from thence that ſuch trade is prejudicial. In order to know this it muſt be inquired, what *Eaſt-India* goods continue in the nation? how far ſuch goods are neceſſary? whether the goods exported are not more than were purchaſed by the bullion? whether ſuch exported goods do not anſwer at other markets for what muſt have been otherwiſe paid for in caſh? and whether, if after all theſe things are conſidered, it ſhould appear, that a certain quantity of bullion is drained off from the nation, the advantage ariſing from the employment of ſuch a number of ſhips and ſailors as are neceſſarily engaged in going to and from the *Eaſt-Indies*, and in carrying the companies goods to other markets, is not more than an equivalent for the loſs of ſuch bullion? but if it could be made appear, that ſuch ſhips and ſailors are wanted for the carrying on of a more profitable trade, that the *Eaſt-India* goods exported do not anſwer for caſh, and ſerve only to introduce others we ſhould have done without, and that ſuch of them as are neceſſary for our own uſe added to thoſe exported that may anſwer for caſh, do not equal in value the bullion exported to the *Eaſt-Indies*, then the trade however profitable to the company is prejudicial to the country, and tends to drain off that bullion, without which you cannot go to the markets of foreign ſtates for the moſt uſeful and ne-

ceſſary

ceſſary commodities, if the balance of trade is againſt you. While we deal with foreign ſtates, there muſt be upon the whole, that balance of trade in favour of our country, that ſhall enable us to purchaſe naval ſtores and the like, or a main part of our defence muſt fail us; for we have no gold or ſilver mines to ſupply us. Now whatever branch of commerce tends, after all that can be ſaid in its favour, to leſſen this balance upon the whole, ſuch commerce is certainly prejudicial, and ought to be declined.

The above thoughts, though they will hold good with regard to our trading with foreign ſtates, will not do it when applied to our colonies. Was the trade of the mother country and its colonies to be confined to each other, and could they in each other meet withall that either wants for its ſecurty, however divided by diſtance, they would ſtill be as one nation: the interfering ocean ſhould be only as a large river dividing between two counties; and the ſhips employed in navigating between them, as bridges and water-carriages. In this caſe gold and ſilver would be no more neceſſary, than if they were abſolutely one nation: but if the uſe of it is adopted out of conveniency, as a meaſurement by which to judge of the value of each others commodities, the mother country is not prejudiced by any balance of trade that is againſt her, ſuppoſing that ſhe does not ſuffer her bullion to be exported to her colonies, but obliges the coloniſt to come and enjoy the balance in the mother



mother country; for here ſhe receives in the perſon of the coloniſt the balance againſt her, returned into her own boſom. A diſadvantage its true may ariſe to the mother country, from the colonies having the balance on their ſide; ſuppoſing that the coloniſts are ſo enriched by that balance upon coming to the mother country, that they get into the management of affairs, and can influence to thoſe meaſures, that at the ſame time that they are ſerviceable to the colonies, are a hurt to the mother country. An inſtance of this nature had nearly happened, when a ſtrong puſh was made to prevent the diſtilling of corn, tho' ſufficiently cheap to admit of it, and to confine the diſtiller to the uſe of moloſſes; and when one of the firſt trading cities in the world was drawn in to petition on the wrong ſide, where the diſpute was not, whether diſtilling ſhould be ſuffered, but whether the *Britiſh land-holder* or the *Weſt-Indian planter* ſhould have the benefit of it.

A nation having colonies may reap an advantage from them, not only by ſupplying itſelf, but by drawing from thence commodities for the markets of other ſtates; and tho' there is no gain upon ſuch commodities, and it is but barely paid for carrying them from place to place, yet it hath a conſiderable benefit from the number of ſhips, and ſailors, and other hands that are employed in doing it. Let it be remark'd, that it is not ſo much the gain of any particular trade, as the quantity of ſhipping, and perſons employed in carrying it

on, that makes it beneficial to the community. A loſing trade to individuals, may on this account be ſo beneficial to the public, as to make it a matter of prudence for the ſtate to give an equivalent in bounties for ſuch loſs, that ſo it may continue to be carried on.

Colonies ſhould be traded with as much as poſſible, and ſhould be encouraged to grow thoſe articles, for which the mother country is obliged to go to another ſtate; and it is to the advantage of the mother country, to promote the growth of them by large bounties, rather than pay caſh for them to foreigners. The bodies and eſtates of the coloniſts are as much the riches of our country, as tho' comprehended within the ſame terrritory; and methods may be fallen upon, to make them as uſeful to the community, as the inhabitants of two different counties. Hence it follows; that bounties given to the colonies are of no diſſervice to us. The bounty returns tho' in another ſhape; and there's a ſaving to the nation by the growth of the goods encouraged by the bounty. To explain this point, let us ſuppoſe, that fifty thouſand pounds were given away in encouraging the growth of a hundred thouſand pounds worth of hemp; ſuch hemp would ſtand us in a 150,000 l. but then the 100,000 l. that we muſt have paid for it in caſh, had we purchaſed it in *Ruſſia*, would remain in our hands; and 'twould be ſtrange if the materials of the goods, with which we ſhould pay the 150,000 l. were worth any thing like two thirds of the ſum: but then



but then this thought muſt be taken into the account, that the labour employed in working up ſuch materials was redundant, and could not have been put to a more valuable uſe.

A nation and its colonies may trade in the ſame articles, the growth of their ſeveral lands, to the ſame market, and yet the mother country not be injured by it; yea, tho' the goods of the laſt may not fetch the advanced price, they would otherwiſe have done; for, tho' they may not fetch that advanced price, they may fetch a ſufficient to anſwer the ends of trade; the goods of the mother country and its colonies may together produce much more than the firſt alone would have done, tho' they had borne an advanced price; and what the colonies gain by ſuch trade may be laid out with the mother country. The colonies, by trading to the ſame market with the ſame articles, may ſerve only to exclude foreigners from rivaling their mother country, and pocketing that caſh, which at length comes into the lap of the latter.

Thus much for trade in general, now for our WEST-INDIAN in particular. This is certainly of great importance, and ought not to be depreciated: but it beſpeaks no ſmall ignorance or inattention, to place that importance, in the value of the goods imported from the *Weſt-Indies*. Were the imports from thence worth but half as much, and yet double the quantity, the trade would be twice as advantageous as at preſent. 'Tis the quantity

of ſhipping and men employed, in and by means of it, that makes it ſo valuable to the community. The balance of trade in favour of our *Weſt-Indian* iſlands would prove at length extremely prejudicial to us, was it not, that a great part of it is ſunk, by exchanging it for the balance due from the iſlands to the continental colonies, and for which the accounts of the latter, with the mother country, are credited; and that the other part of it which remains ſtanding, is not diſcharged by bullion, ſent to the *Weſt-Indies:* but the coloniſt is obliged either to make purchaſe of it in ſtock, land, or the like, or to come over and enjoy it. The trade to *Africa*, which depends much upon our *Weſt-Indian*, is indeed lucrative; but if it was leſs lucrative, and the ſhipping employed in it much more numerous, it would be more beneficial by far to the community, When the *Examiner begs leave to repeat it, and to fix it in the reader's memory that the* African *trade centers in, and is ſupported by the* Weſt-Indies *, many of his readers are thereby led to conclude, that it centers wholly in, and is altogether ſupported by them; and he hath been careful not to prevent their making this concluſion, by mentioning the numbers of negroes that are employed in our continental colonies, particularly *Virginia* and the *Carolina*'s. The mention of this would not have favoured his deſign, which is, not ſo much to ſhew the neceſſity of our *Weſt-Indian*

* Page 28.

territo-



territories being increaſed, as to prevent *Guadaloupe*'s being reſtored.

Whatever other writers may have unwarily advanced, an increaſe of *ſugar land* would be of advantage to our country, provided the planter, when he hath made his fortune, does not come over and receive it, and then carry it to *France* or ſome other country; which was he to do, we ſhould certainly be loſers, unleſs, beſides paying ourſelves for the freight, &c. we ſhould receive from foreign markets in return for his goods, the balance we ſhould have to pay him. Let us ſee what would be the conſequence had we more *ſugar land*. More ſugars would be brought to market, and therefore a greater quantity of ſhipping and ſailors be employed. The conſumption of ſugar muſt be encreaſed, or the commodity muſt be exported, to keep up its preſent value. If exported, an equivalent of ſome ſort would be received for it, and thereby the national ſtock be encreaſed. Should not the exports be ſufficient to carry off the quantity thrown in upon us by the increaſe of our *ſugar land*, and ſhould the community refuſe increaſing their conſumption at the preſent prices, the commodity would lower, be bought up, and conſumed at the under price, and the community be benefited by that fall, though the growers would have ſmaller gains.

If the increaſed *ſugar land* is uncultivated, then the planters undertaking to cultivate it, muſt procure themſelves a ſtock of negroes, which muſt

be

be ſupplied by the *African* trader, as well as be maintained by him afterwards. Not only ſo, but a new market is actually provided for the continental coloniſt, at which to diſpoſe of his plank, lumber, ſtaves and proviſion. But if the increaſe is by the acquiſition of cultivated *ſugar land*, the caſe is altered. The planters are ſtocked already, and the *African* trader is wanted, no further than to keep it up. No new market is opened for the continental coloniſt, for he traded to the ſame place before. This brings me to a main argument, uſed by the *Examiner* to prove the neceſſity of our increaſing our *Weſt-Indian* territory. His words are, *There is another conſideration relative to this trade, ſtill more important in itſelf, and more eſſential in the preſent examination, becauſe it will point out to us how ill we conſult the intereſt of* North America *herſelf, either relatively to her own particular proſperity, or to her intercourſe with us, when we happen, as I conceive we have in this treaty, to neglect the* Weſt-Indian *commerce.*

*For ſeveral of the moſt conſiderable commodities of* North America, *there exiſts no other market whatever, than the* Weſt-Indian *iſlands. In a word, it is by means of the* Weſt-Indian *trade, that a great part of* North America *is at all enabled to trade with us* *. *So that in reality the trade of theſe* North American *provinces, when ſtated in its true light, is, as well as that of* Africa, *to be regarded but as a dependent*

* Page 28, 29.



*member, and ſubordinate department of the* Weſt-Indian *trade; it muſt riſe and fall exactly as the* Weſt-Indies *flouriſh or decay* *. The *Examiner* profeſſes in a ſubſequent paragraph his zeal for the continental colonies, but adds, *I ſhould be ſorry it were found to be a zeal without knowledge.* I am ſorry that his zeal for the *Weſt-India* is a zeal without knowledge, or without honeſty. Who would not ſuppoſe in reading the above quotations, but that the *Examiner* underſtood by *Weſt-Indies*, our own *Weſt-Indian* iſlands, and was inſiſting upon the dependance of our continental colonies on theſe. But if ſo, what becomes of his argument, when he writes but a little lower, *our ſugar colonies would ſuffer much leſs from a deficiency in* North America, *than thoſe of* France, *to whoſe proſperity the trade with the* Engliſh *northern colonies is more neceſſary by far, than it is to the* Engliſh Weſt-Indies. In another place †, *the* North American *trade has extended; becauſe it found a market, not indeed in the* Engliſh, *but in the* French *ſugar colonies. Acquiſition in the* Weſt-Indies *muſt increaſe our limited and decaying ſugar trade, and at the ſame time recall our, extenſive indeed, but erring trade of* North America, *from* French *to* Engliſh *markets.* Thus the *Examiner* acknowledges, that our *North American* colonies have an extenſive trade with the *French Weſt-Indian* iſlands. Pray what advantage then would it be to the *North American* colonies, to have theſe iſlands

* Page 30. † Page 36.

ſecured to the *Engliſh*, unleſs their *extenſive* trade with them ſhould be thereby extended? They have an extenſive trade with them now they are *French*; they would have but the ſame were they *Engliſh*. This extenſive trade the *Examiner* ſtiles *erring*: in what ſenſe? The *Engliſh* iſlands are ſupplied to the full, and upon as good terms as tho' the continental coloniſts did not trade with the *French*: and the *Examiner* allows *, that it is owing to this trade, together with the *Weſt-Indian* trades being crampt for want of land, that the *Weſt-Indian* trade has not increaſed in proportion to that of *North America*. There is no more error in our continental colonies trading to the *French* iſlands with lumber, proviſion, and the like articles, the produce of the country, than there is in *Great Britain*'s trading to *France* with corn, lead, and coal. The advantage gained by the coloniſt from that trade, enables him to increaſe his trade with the mother country. But as he hath this trade, what neceſſity is there for retaining acquiſitions upon his account? *Guadaloupe* traded with *North America* before the war, and now ſhe has been conquered, only continues *to carry on a greater trade, than any* Engliſh *iſland does with* North America †. What pity is it! that he who owns *a conſideration of things out of their due order, is often worſe than no conſideration of them at all* ‡, ſhould not conſider better. The *Examiner*, when ac-

* Page 35, 36. † Page 43. ‡ Page 31.

count-



counting for the manner in which the balance on the ſide of the *Weſt-Indies* is anſwered for, adds, that this is done, thirdly, *in the great ſums ſpent by the* Weſt-Indian *planters reſident in* England; *whereas we derive ſcarce any advantage of that kind, from any of the continental plantations to the northward* *. Theſe words imply, that there is an advantage ariſing to us from the great ſums ſpent by the planters among us. But where's the advantage, when ſuch ſums are what they receive from us in balance. The only advantage conſiſts in its being ſpent among us, and not among foreigners; but it's firſt paid by us before it's ſpent among us. And the reaſon why we have ſcarce any advantage of this kind, none worth mentioning, from any of the continental plantations to the northward, is a very good one, and what we ſhould rejoice in, viz. the balance of trade with them is greatly in our favour.

The *Examiner* intimates the propriety of increaſing our ſugar land from our not having enough for the conſumption of all our *Britiſh* dominions †. And yet he aſſerts ‡ that *the fact is*, that *the whole produce of* Guadaloupe, *except cotton, is exported.* Whereto? Not to our *American* colonies or *Ireland*, for if ſo doubtleſs he would have mentioned it. Beſides, Guadaloupe *continues to carry on a greater trade, than any* Engliſh *iſland does, with* North America; *and in* Ireland *they uſe only ſome ſugars and ſyrups* ‖, a ſmall ſome. If then the *Guadaloupe*

* P. 35. † Page 18. ‡ Page 61. ‖ Page 18.



ſugars

ſugars are exported to a foreign market, and are not wanted in a time of war to ſupply the conſumption of our *Britiſh* dominions, much leſs will they be wanted in a time of peace, when our *North American* colonies have an extenſive trade with the *French* iſlands, and *Ireland* may come in for a ſhare with them. The *Examiner* to help on his deſign, endeavours to alarm our fears by inſtilling an apprehenſion of danger, with regard to our poſſeſſions in the *Weſt-Indies*. Guadaloupe *lies to the windward of* Antigua, Nevis, Monſerrat, St. Kits, *and all that cluſter of ſmall* Engliſh *iſlands, and conſequently thoſe iſlands are moſt liable to be attacked from thence, if it returns to* France, *and this iſland is moſt capable of protecting them if it remains in our hands, it is certainly very extraordinary that all ſhould be ſacrificed to the idea of ſecurity in* North America, *where we were infinitely ſtronger than the* French, *and that no notion of danger ſhould be entertained for our valuable poſſeſſions in the* Weſt-Indies, *where we are infinitely weaker than the* French *. But it is more extraordinary, that the *Examiner* ſhould attempt to alarm us with an apprehenſion of danger, from the ſituation of *Guadaloupe*, and the ſtrength of the *French* in the *Weſt-Indies*, when not only that, but all their other iſlands, *Domingo*, and *St. Cruz* excepted, have been taken from them, and are in the number of our conqueſts.

Now let us turn our thoughts to our CONTINENTAL COLONIES, and conſider their *intrinſic*, *comparative*, and *adventitious* value.

* Page 66, the note.

Their



Their *intrinſic* value conſiſts in their *trade*, *ſituation*, *ſtrength* and *fruitfuleſs*. The aggregate ſum of the exports and imports to and from *North America*, in the year 1758, amounted to 2,481,631 l. 14 s. 2 d. The goods amounting to this ſum, being many (if not moſt) of them of a bulky nature, muſt neceſſarily employ a conſiderable quantity of ſhipping and ſeamen in tranſporting them: but beſides the great advantage ariſing from thence, it muſt be obſerved, that of theſe goods 1,832,948 l. 13 s. 10 d., worth, were exported from the mother country, and that numbers of our own inhabitants were employed in making them up. The balance of trade with our continental colonies, is in our favour to the amount of 1,184,265 l. 13 s. 6 d. Now tho' the balance of trade, may be againſt the mother country, in favour of her colonies, without her being eſſentially prejudiced thereby, ſo as to require her giving it up; as when the coloniſt is obliged to come and ſpend that balance in her own land, as before obſerved: yet there is, certainly, a conſiderable advantage in her having the balance in her own favour. Her own manufacturers are maintained by working up the goods to be exported, and the colonies are obliged to remit the caſh, procured by their trading to other places, to pay off the balance; and it is in this way that our continental colonies are drained of the gold and ſilver, that they receive in return for their proviſions, &c. ſold to the *French* and others. Whenever the balance of trade is againſt a colony, that colony muſt pay the difference in good bills

or in caſh, or ſhe will be no longer truſted by the mother country; and whenever the means of ſupplying herſelf with theſe fail, ſhe muſt contrive to increaſe her exports, by growing or procuring what will find a ſale in the mother country, or ſhe muſt leſſen her imports.

But while I am ſpeaking to the trade of our continental colonies, I muſt not omit their extenſive trade to the *Weſt-Indies*, both *French* and *Engliſh*, and to other places, from whence they collect wherewith to pay us the balance. By means of this trade, they nurſe up and employ a number of ſailors, ſhipwrights, and others, that may upon occaſion be ſerviceable to the navy of the mother country.

Thus much for the *trade* of the continental colonies, now for their *ſituation*, which reckoning from the northernmoſt part of the peninſula of *Nova Scotia* (to which the *French* were for confining us) to the ſouthernmoſt part of *Georgia*, lies between 46° and 31° 30′ north latitude, and therefore admits of their growing all the *European* commodities, for tho' *Ruſſia* is more to the northward, yet hemp and flax may be grown in a warmer climate. Wines, oils, and fruits, might be raiſed in one or other of our continental colonies, as well as in *France*, *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Italy*, or the *Madeiras*; not only ſo, but that very article of *cotton* for the ſake of which the *Examiner* argues, that we ought to retain *Guadaloupe*. *Georgia* is ſufficiently warm, to favour the growth of it. That more *European* commodities are not raiſed in our continental colonies, is not owing



owing to want of territory, but of people and encouragement. The *northern* colonies (I ſpeak not of *Nova Scotia*) which are by far the moſt populous, are diſcouraged from raiſing any quantities of hemp and flax, becauſe they make better of their lands, by growing corn and the like for the *Weſt-Indies*, and other places: the *ſouthern* can employ all their hands in raiſing tobacco, indigo, rice, ſilk, &c. or if any of them could be ſpared for the cultivation of different commodities, it is not done becauſe of the difficulties attending the introduction of a new branch of buſineſs. The prudent planter will ſtick to his tobacco, indigo, rice, &c. while he can procure a ſupport from them, tho' they do not yield him the ſame gains as formerly, rather than hazard his ruin by cultivating the vine, the olive, and the like, with which he is but little acquainted, when at an utter uncertainty, whether his commodity will fetch its prime coſt at market. But let him be properly informed, the neceſſary lights be given him, and a ſuitable encouragement be propoſed, and he will attempt the growth of new articles. I ſhall be heartily glad to find, that the premiums propoſed, by the *Society for the encouragement of arts, manufactures, and commerce*, prove effectual for the introduction of new branches of trade among our coloniſts. Whether its views are anſwered or no, it hath made a noble attempt. But ſhould not premiums prevail, neceſſity will at length oblige the colonies to grow other commodities, and to betake themſelves to new branches of trade; and this neceſſity will be

brought

brought upon them by the increaſe of their numbers. Their preſent branches of trade will, after a few years, be inſufficient to ſupport the inhabitants, who multiply in an amazing degree; and when inſufficient for that, neceſſity, the mother of invention, will force them to introduce others; and the extent of the country will favour the introduction of them. However, as it may prove detrimental to the preſent branches of trade, to leave things 'till they come to this criſis, it would be in character for the Legiſlature, to encourage, by proper bounties, the introduction of others, 'till they had got root ſufficient to ſupport themſelves.

I go on to make ſome obſervations on the *ſtrength* of our colonies, by which I underſtand the capacity they are in, of ſeconding our operations againſt an enemy, which ought by no means to be overlooked. The greateſt conqueſt made the laſt war was effected by the colony troops, I refer to the reduction of *Cape Breton*. They have alſo been extremely ſerviceable in the preſent, and contributed to the taking of *Louiſbourg*, *Martinico*, and the *Havannah*, not to mention *Montreal*, and other places, at the back of their own ſettlements. I ſhall not ſay, that all the colonies have done their duty, in ſeconding a war began in their defence; what I mean to aſſert is, that without *their men*, either in the provincial or government *American* regiments, we could not have made the figure we have done in the war; for our own country hath been



been drained, notwithſtanding, what with regulars and militia. Our navy, I apprehend, has not received any thing like the advantage from our colonies, that the army has done. But in a future period, both may receive a much greater, from the *fruitfulneſs* of our colonies: I intend not, the fruitfulneſs of the land, but of the inhabitants. How it is in the *ſouthern* colonies I know not, but the people of the *northern, independent of foreign recruits, double themſelves in twenty-five years*, as is allowed by the *Examiner* *. We may reaſonably conclude then, that, in the ſpace of fifteen years, we may raiſe out of our continental colonies, an army of twenty thouſand men (eſpecially if they have no enemy at their back) which may be employed, in caſe of a freſh rupture with *France*, againſt her *Weſt-Indian* iſlands, or upon other ſervices, while our own manufacturers are ſpared. Whoever is acquainted with the ſituation of places, knows that it is much ſafer and eaſier, to carry on expeditions, againſt the *Weſt-Indies* or parts adjacent, from our colonies than from hence; and then, a great ſaving may be made in the article of tranſport ſervice, by hiring what ſhips can be got upon the ſpot, which will cut off the enemies ſupplies of proviſion. The ſtrength, which in a few years the fruitfulneſs of our colonies will give them, if not diverted by defending their back ſettlements, and rendered unneceſſary for the ſecurity of their

* Page 83.

coaſts,

coasts, by the superiority of our fleets, properly managed and directed, will, upon a new war, render the tenure of the *French* islands extremely precarious to the mother country, and it will not be any garrisons, that *France* can maintain in them for any long time, that can insure them.

The next thing to be considered, is, the *comparative* value of our continental colonies. I mean not to compare particular colonies, with particular *West-Indian* islands, much less with the whole of them; but the whole of the one, with the whole of the other; and I hope to show by this comparison, that the advantage is greatly on the side of our continental colonies, against our *West-Indian* islands, tho' it may not be in proportion to the inhabitants of each. It is not with any pleasure I enter upon this comparison, as some may be ready to interpret it, into an attempt to disparage our *West-Indies*, while it's only intended to prevent mistaken apprehensions of colony interests. The *Examiner*, in shewing the importance of our *West-Indian* commerce, tells us *, *that almost the whole of that extensive and lucrative trade, which we carry on with the coast of* Africa, *is maintained by, and must be put to the account of the* West-Indies; and then adds below, *of fire arms, ammunition, utensils, stuffs, and spirits, we exported in the year* 1761, *to the value of* 254,381 l. 11 s. 5 d. besides, *an assortment of* East-India *goods*, to the amount of

* Page 27.





78,576 l. 18 s. 6 d. The reader concludes, that the exportation of these goods to *Africa* is owing to our *West-Indian* islands. But herein he mistakes. These goods were exported in 1761; and the *Examiner* informs us *, that this present year *the negroes sold at* Guadaloupe *were not fewer than* 4000, which he supposes amounted to 120,000 l. The negroes sold at *Guadaloupe* this year, were without doubt purchased by the goods exported to *Africa* the last: and therefore, there must be deducted from the account of the exports to *Africa*, occasioned by our own *West-Indian* commerce, the prime cost of the negroes sold at *Guadaloupe*, reckoning to that cost, the sunken value of those that died in the passage, and by one accident, and another, never arrived at market, which we will set at 78,576 l. 18 s. 6 d. the value of the *East-India* goods. I may have over-rated them, but think that trade sufficiently lucrative, that clears one third, to pay for freight and satisfy the merchant. How came the *Examiner* to take the exports to *Africa* of the year 1761, a year, in which they were greatly increased by the view of purchasing negroes for the market at *Guadaloupe*? Was it owing to artifice or oversight? If he had meant to have given his reader the true state of the case, he should have taken the exports to *Africa* before the war, he should have shewn how many of these goods, were bartered away for negroes, and not for gold-

* Page 51.

duſt, elephants teeth, or other articles, and how many of theſe negroes were diſpoſed of, in our *Weſt-Indian* iſlands, and how many at our continental markets; but this would not have favoured his deſign. The *Examiner* ſays *, that ſcarce any part of *Guadaloupe* is fully ſlaved, that this iſland yielded *the laſt year, more than a third of the whole of what we imported from all our old* Weſt-Indian *plantations put together* †, *and that, for an age to come in the* Engliſh *hands, it would be the very beſt market for ſlaves* ‡; from hence we may infer, that our old *Weſt-Indian* plantations (of which we are ſpeaking in this compariſon of the *Weſt-Indies* and continental colonies) did not take off annually 10,000 negroes, more eſpecially when it's conſidered, how well theſe plantations are ſlaved, and that *Guadaloupe* might buy the more freely under an apprehenſion, that ſhe ſhould ſoon return to *France*, and then not be able to ſupply herſelf upon terms equally advantageous. Theſe 10,000 negroes, according to the above eſtimate, would amount to 196,442 l. 6 s. 3 d. or in other words, the goods truckt away for the negroes, which after all accidents ſhould ſupply the *Weſt-Indian* markets with 10,000, would be worth no more than 196,442 l. 6 s. 3 d. inſtead of 254,381 l. 11 s. 5 d. But if, as I judge the caſe is, I have ſet the gains of the negroe trader too low, and theſe ſhould be cent. per cent. which I believe to be nearer the mark, then

* Page 48. † Page 49. ‡ Page 49.

for



for the negroes, out of which upon his getting to market he had 10,000 to diſpoſe of, at 30 l. a head, he bartered away goods to the value of only 150,000 l. This will ſhew how little reaſon there was for the *Examiner*'s placing the exports to *Africa* of 1761, amounting in the whole (the aſſortment of *Eaſt-Indian* goods included) to 332,958 l. 9 s. 11 d. to the account of the *Weſt-Indian* commerce. But that the goods bartered away for negroes to be ſold in the *Weſt-Indies* did not amount in 1758 to 254,381 l. 11 s. 5 d. we may conclude, upon the following account. In that year there was a balance due from *Great Britain* to the *Weſt-Indies* of 956,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. Now if the prime coſt of the negroes amounted to the above ſum, then the trader would have for them at the *Weſt-Indian* market reckoning his gain at fifty per cent. 381,572 l. 7 s. 1 d $\frac{1}{2}$; let this be deducted from the above balance, and there remains 574,891 l. 15 s. 1 d $\frac{1}{2}$. But this will not admit of the *Weſt-Indian* planters *taking upon themſelves the payment of* a very large part *of that exceſſive* North American *deficiency* that amounts to 1,184,265 l. 13 s. 6 d. and alſo of their ſpending *very great ſums* in *England*, according to the *Examiner's* repreſentation of matters *. But if the profit of the negroe trade is to be reckoned at the rate of cent. per cent. then they would have only 447,700 l. 19 s. 5 d. to pay ſuch large part of the *North American* deficiency,

* Page 34, 35.



and

and to ſupply them with ſuch great ſums. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe then upon the whole, that the value of the goods bartered for negroes on the coaſts of *Africa* to be ſold in the *Weſt-Indies*, does not amount to more than 150,000 l. at which eſtimate we will fix it. This 150,000 l. added to the exports, gives us the whole value of the goods taken off by the *Weſt Indian* commerce, and together amounted in 1758 to 1,027,571 l. 19 s. 11 d. but this falls vaſtly ſhort of the exports to our continental colonies the ſame year, which, without reckoning any thing for the goods with which the negroes bought by them are purchaſed on the coaſt of *Africa*, came to 1,832,948 l. 13 s. 10 d. Thus we ſee, that when the moſt has been made of the *Weſt-Indian* commerce, that with our continental colonies exceeds it by 805,376 l. 13 s. 11 d. in point of exports, and therefore helps to ſupport, as many more of our manufacturers as are employed in making up the goods amounting to the ſaid ſum. The reader will have a clear idea of the matter from the following ſtate of the account.

| Exports to our Continental Colonies l. s. d. | | Trade to the *Weſt Indies* l. s. d. |
|---|---|---|
| 1,832,948 13 10 | direct exports | 877,571 19 11 |
| | indirect to *Africa*, to purchaſe Negroes for the *Weſt Indies* | 150,000 0 0 |
| 1,027,571 19 11 | | 1,027,571 19 11 |

805,376 l. 13 s. 11 d. nearer four-fifths than three-fourths of all the trade to the *Weſt-Indies* whether



ther direct or indirect. I have not charged the negroes at the price they fetch, but at the price they coſt, as the advanced price at which they are ſold is the profit of the *African* trader, and does not properly belong to the account, and as his gains are paid in ſugar directly or indirectly (the balance with the *Weſt-Indies* being ſo much againſt us) a commodity eaten up among ourſelves. By this time the reader I hope is fully convinced, how much more important our trade to our continental colonies, is, than that to the *Weſt-Indies*. But ſays the *Examiner* *, accounting for the manner of our balancing with the *Weſt-Indian*, this is done, firſt, *by our* Weſt-Indies *taking upon themſelves the payment of a very large part of that exceſſive* North American *deficiency, a fact that would clearly have ſhewn the dependance of* North America *on that trade, without which our* North American *colonies could never pay for, nor conſequently take off, our manufactures.* Here, as well as elſewhere, he makes our trade to our continental colonies to depend upon our *Weſt-Indian* iſlands. But did not our continental colonies trade with our *Weſt-Indian* iſlands, ſtill our trade to the colonies would be greater than our trade to the *Weſt-Indies*. There is a balance in favour of the *Weſt-Indies* againſt our country to the amount of 956,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. out of this balance the *African* trader is to be paid for his negroes, which, reckoning his gains at cent. per cent. and the negroes purchaſed, as above at 150,000 l.

* Page 34.

makes

make 300,000 l. This 300,000 l. deducted from the balance due to the *Weſt-Indies*, leaves 656,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. out of this *the planters reſident in* England *ſpend very great ſums*, which we cannot ſet at leſs than 100,000 l. and then there is left 556,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. all which we will ſuppoſe goes towards paying the *North American* deficiency in return for goods had from the continent; but was the trade between our continental colonies and the *Weſt-Indies* to be at an end, and our continental colonies to be thereby obliged to reduce the exports from *England* to 556,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. leſs, ſtill the exports would amount to 1,276,484 l. 11 s. 7 d. near upon 250,000 l. more than the whole trade to the *Weſt-Indies* as above ſtated. Our prodigious trade then to our continental colonies, does not depend upon our *Weſt-Indies*, ſo as the *Examiner* hath repreſented. If indeed, by means of the *Weſt-Indies*, our exports to the continental colonies amount to 556,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. more than they would otherwiſe do, we thence infer the importance of the *Weſt-Indies* to *England*, but not the dependance of the colonies upon our *Weſt-Indies*. There's a mutual intercourſe between theſe two, from whence ariſes an advantage to each, making them dependant upon one another. The *Weſt-Indian* depends as much upon the coloniſt for being ſupplied with lumber, plank, ſtaves, and proviſion, as the coloniſt does upon the *Weſt-Indian* for taking theſe commodities off his hands: nay, was the trade between the continental colonies and the





*Weſt-Indies* to be prohibited, and were the latter to be confined in their purchaſe of theſe commodities to the market of the mother country, it could ſcarce be queſtioned, whether ſuch prohibition would not prove almoſt or altogether fatal to the ſugar planter. The continental colonies could do better without our *Weſt-Indies*, than the latter could without the former; and therefore it is a groſs miſrepreſentation, to make our continental colonies and our trade with them, dependant upon the *Weſt-Indies*. In one thing indeed our *Weſt-Indian* commerce has the advantage of our *North-American*, as the imports and exports of the former when put together exceed thoſe of the latter. The joint ſum of imports from and exports to the *Weſt-Indies* amounts to 2,711,608 l. 2 s. 1 d. whereas the exports and imports to and from the continental colonies ariſe to no more than 2,481,631 l. 14 s. 2 d. Suppoſing then that the commodities on each ſide are equally bulky, and that the *Weſt-Indies* (notwithſtanding the balance is much in their favour) confine themſelves to the taking off a proportionable quantity with the continental colonies of thoſe goods that employ the moſt manufacturers, a greater number of ſhipping are engaged in going to and from the *Weſt-Indies*, than in going to and from our continental colonies, and the exports to the *Weſt-Indies* are equally advantageous to the mother country with the exports to the continental colonies, in the proportion that theſe exports bear to each other. But as the exports to

our continental colonies exceed thoſe to the *Weſt-Indies* by 805,376l. 13s. 11d. our trade with the former muſt employ a prodigious number of hands more than our trade with the latter, near upon four fifths more. As to the great, the *very great ſums* ſpent among us by the planters they are gained from us, and bear but very little proportion to the great ſums ſent in by our continental colonies in bills or caſh, to be ſpent among us by our own inhabitants in a way of trade; and then fifty thouſand pounds ſpent in this way, whereby a number of people are ſupported, are better to the nation than a hundred thouſand ſpent in high living, extravagance, and debauchery, tending to introduce a corruption of manners, and by ruining the morals of mankind to deſtroy the community.

But of all the advantages, that our continental colonies have over the *Weſt-Indies*, none equals that ariſing from their extent of territory, in which particular the *Weſt-Indies* bear no manner of proportion to them. The *Examiner* allows, *that our* Weſt-Indian *trade has been cramped* merely for want of land *; and ſo it would be in a ſhort time had we *Guadaloupe*: for tho' the poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe* would have increaſed our *Weſt-Indian* trade; yet, as after that had been cultivated to the utmoſt, we ſhould have been able to have vented more ſugars, what with the foreign and home conſumption, the trade would have ſtill been cramp-

* Page 36.

ed



ed for want of land. Continental ſugar land is the only certain remedy for curing our ſugar trade of the cramp; the adding of another iſland to our *Weſt Indies* would only have afforded a temporary relief, not but that this is better than none. As continental ſugar land is the only certain remedy for this diſorder, ſo it's the only certain one againſt the engroſſment of plantations, by which the planter is enabled, to fix what price he pleaſes upon his commodity in our own markets. Where we have this continental ſugar land, or continental land, admitting of the growth of the ſugar cane, I hope to ſhew in another place. But, to cloſe the compariſon between our continental colonies and *Weſt-Indies*, with obſerving that there is no probability that the former will be cramped *merely for want of land* while the world ſtandeth, and to enter upon the conſideration of the *adventitious* value of our continental colonies.

The *adventitious* value of our continental colonies, conſiſts in their being capable of receiving, whatever numbers the increaſing populouſneſs of the mother country may force from their native ſoil; in the protection they afford to our *American* fiſhery; and in the amazing difference there is between their being in our hands and in the hands of the *French*. Such is their capaciouſneſs, that our own country need never be overſtocked, nor our countrymen be obliged to go among a people of a ſtrange language in order to their procuring a livelihood: let them but carry honeſty and induſtry

along with them, and if favoured with the bleſſings of health and ſtrength, they will be able to ſupport themſelves comfortably in one or other of our colonies, and by being with thoſe that ſpeak the ſame tongue, and have the ſame cuſtoms with themſelves, will forget that they are not in the land of their nativity. However it may not be attended to in common, it is certainly an advantage to a country, to poſſeſs colonies that can take off its ſuperfluous hands, and turn them to a valuable account; when otherwiſe they muſt have been loſt to it, or have proved a burden if not a nuiſance. This advantage I hope we ſhall derive from our continental colonies and acquiſitions, when the peace ſhall have cut off from thouſands the preſent means of ſubſiſtence; that ſo humanity may not be ſhocked with ſeeing the ſoldier or ſailor begging bread or hanging at the gallows, who but a little before fought the battles of his country with undaunted courage. But of this more particularly elſewhere, and to mention, that our continental colonies, one and another of them, are by means of their ſituation of no ſmall ſervice to our *American* fiſhery. They ſerve to cover and protect it; and afford convenient harbours for our ſhipping to repair to on an emergency, as was the caſe when the *French* had taken *St. John*'s in *Newfoundland*; beſides the utility they are of, by their markets, to the perſons employed in ſuch fiſhery. This fiſhery could not be ſo ſecure, extenſive, or profitable, was it not for our continental colonies. But what



what an amazing difference is there between the continental colonies being in our hands and in the hands of the *French!* for had they theſe, they would ſoon ruin this valuable fiſhery, as to our concern in it, and not only ſo but in time our whole trade. The continental colonies being in our hands, we have a moſt extenſive trade with them. They drain off ſome of the riches of the *French Weſt-Indies* in return for their proviſion, plank, &c. They ſupply our own *Weſt-Indies* upon eaſy terms, with commodities, that theſe could not have from *England*, or upon ſuch terms only, as would be too heavy for them by that time they arrived at the place of deſtination. But were they in the hands of the *French*, we ſhould loſe all our preſent trade with them, which would be thrown into our enemy's ſcale. The *French* would ſoon poſſeſs themſelves of our *Weſt-Indies*, or ſo cramp our *Weſt Indian* trade as greatly to leſſen its value: they would want no more corn from us, but would import it from *America*: they would be in the high road to univerſal monarchy, and our very independency would be endangered. The preſervation of the continental colonies, we may deem, as things are now circumſtanced, eſſential to our continuing a free people; and therefore ought to have the ſecond place in our thoughts. Our miniſtry acted wiſely then, in paying the attention they did to them, in the negotiation of 1761; and in providing for their ſecurity, by ſtipulating for the ceſſion of all *Canada*.

But this neceſſarily brings me to ſpeak of CANADA; in doing of which I ſhall obſerve, that our continental colonies could not have had a ſufficient ſecurity, without the poſſeſſion of *all Canada*: ſhall ſhew how far the poſſeſſion of *Canada* ſecures them; and then inſiſt upon the advantages to be drawn from *Canada* as a colony.

I obſerve, that our continental colonies could not have had a ſufficient ſecurity, without the poſſeſſion of *all Canada*. The faithfulneſs and ambition of the *French* are too notorious to admit of our ſuppoſing, that our colonies could have been ſafe with them in their neighbourhood, any further, than as our colonies were poſſeſſed of a force to defend themſelves and offend their neighbours. It may be ſaid, that our colonies would have had this force in their ſuperior numbers, had *Canada* reduced to its proper limits, remained to the *French*. Very true, were our divided colonies formed into one body, and united under one governor. But this union is no ways deſirable, as in the end it might breed a new monarchy; and pave the way to their letting up for themſelves, and throwing off their dependance upon the mother country. 'Tis to our advantage, that our *American* dominions on the continent ſhould be ſplit into many governments, having different intereſts, making the whole dependant upon ourſelves. This multiplicity of governments and difference of intereſts, tho' an advantage to us, is a weakening to them, and makes them the leſs capable of oppoſing a common



common enemy; yea, ſhall be preventive of their uniting to repel him, as hath been ſeen in this preſent war. The *Canadians* ſtrengthened by a military force from *France*, tho' not able to cope with our continental colonies, if firmly united and determined upon acting vigorouſly and together as one body, would be capable of conquering one and another of them in a ſeparate and disjointed condition; and if the *French* had once poſſeſſed themſelves of any one colony, and fixed themſelves firmly on the ſea-coaſts, they would in time have ſwallowed up the reſt, or have ſpoilt in a great meaſure their uſefulneſs to the mother country. That the *French* had a ſettled ſcheme of falling upon ſome of our colonies, and were making proviſion for the execution of the ſame, there is no room to doubt of. They were put upon this ſcheme, or encouraged in the proſecution of it, by the tameneſs of the *Britiſh* miniſtry, and the ſtoical indifference with which it heard from time to time that they were making encroachments and erecting one fort after another, inſtead of iſſuing orders to our continental colonies to oppoſe all ſuch ſteps, without waiting for particular direction from *England*. The *French* had at length nearly finiſhed their chain of forts at the back of our colonies, and eſtabliſhed an iſland communication between the mouth of the river *Miſſiſippi* and the river *St. Lawrence*. Had they been let alone 'till they had finiſhed the one, and eſtabliſhed the other, and the affair been ſuffered to reſt for a few years; their

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ſcheme of falling upon our colonies had been brought to maturity; and nothing would have remained, but upon ſome rupture to have put it into execution. But ſays the *Examiner* *, *it was not the danger of our colonies, but the encroachments on our rights which occaſioned the war. Rights, which however remote or inconſiderable, it would not have ſuited the dignity of our crown tamely to have ſeen invaded; but no public act mentioned, and no private man of ſenſe ever thought of danger.* Theſe aſſertions are ſomething extraordinary, and therefore I will beſtow a few remarks upon them. The *French* encroached upon our rights, and when they had done that, they fortified themſelves in their encroachments by building forts; and yet our colonies had no danger to apprehend either preſent or diſtant from ſuch encroachments and forts—I ſay, no danger either preſent or diſtant, becauſe *it was not* danger *that occaſioned the war*, whereas was the *danger* ever ſo diſtant, ſtill it would be *danger*. Thus it appears, that this bloody and expenſive war was began merely to ſupport the dignity of the crown. The rights invaded by the *French* were inconſiderable, and might have remained to them without any danger to our colonies. This is giving a poor account of the riſe of the preſent war, and aſſigning but a bad reaſon for our ſhedding ſo much blood, and ſpending ſo much money. It gives us but a mean opinion of his late majeſty and miniſ-

* Page 86, the note.

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try, who could not deviſe how to ſecure the dignity of the crown, but by entering into a war for a mere punctilio; ſurely they might have ſaved the dignity of the crown, by inſiſting upon the *French* king's making yearly a pepper corn acknowledgement, or paying ſome ſmall conſideration for his being left in the peaceable poſſeſſion of his encroachments; I doubt not, but that he would have made this ſatisfaction readily, and then the war had been prevented; the ſucceſsfulneſs of which was a matter of uncertainty when began. But *no publick act mentioned, and no private man of ſenſe ever thought of danger.* That *no private man of ſenſe ever thought of danger*, may be true enough, according to the *Examiner*'s way of judging, which by his aſſertion appears to be, that if a perſon ever thought of danger, it was an evident proof of his being no man of ſenſe: but, that he ſhould aſſert *no public act mentioned danger*, is what I cannot account for better than by ſuppoſing, that either he or his employer was not arrived from *France*, when his late majeſty iſſued out his declaration of war, that he did not ſee it while there, and that he has not conſulted it ſince he hath had the opportunity, but if he will take the trouble of looking it over, he will meet with the following expreſſions in it, ‘ The unwarrantable proceedings ‘ of the *French* in the *Weſt-Indies* and *North A-* ‘ *merica*, ſince the concluſion of the treaty of *Aix-* ‘ *la-Chapelle*, and the uſurpations and encroach- ‘ ments made by them upon our territories, and

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lonies, would admit of their making freſh encroachments in different places without their being ſoon ſubject to a diſcovery. It is the *encroachers* more than the *encroachments* that have endangered our colonies; and the ſecurity theſe want, is, againſt the *cauſe* more than the *effect*: but the giving back the encroachments does not yield them that ſecurity: the *Canadians* are ſtill left, tho' confined to narrower limits, which unleſs defended they will paſs without heſitation; but the defence of ſuch limits, in every part, will be too expenſive. As to *France*'s agreeing to certain boundaries, 'tis nothing, a mere *Gallica fides*; unleſs theſe are upon one account or other impaſſable. Without then the poſſeſſion of *all Canada* with its inhabitants, our colonies could not have a *ſufficient* ſecurity—I add with its inhabitants, as theſe increaſe the ſecurity by becoming *Engliſh* ſubjects, and as were theſe to remove to *Louiſiana*, the danger would only be removed from the ſtrongeſt to the weakeſt, from the *Northern* to the *Southern* colonies.

But now to ſhew you how far the poſſeſſion of *Canada*, I mean with its inhabitants, ſecures our continental colonies. It does not ſecure them from all moleſtation by ſavages, but from all that moleſtation which the ſavages were ſtirred up to give them by the *French* in *Canada*; who have from time to time, without regarding their being at peace with us, excited the *Indians* to commit horrible ravages. The damage that theſe barbarians do, conſiſts, not ſo much in the numbers they kill, as





as in the perſons, and in the depredations they occaſion. The perſons they fall upon are the back ſettlers, employed in extending the cultivation, and making improvements; but by the *Indian* hoſtilities theſe improvements are ſtopt, and the perſons employed in making them are killed, or drove off their lands with the loſs of all their paſt labour, cattle, &c. and thus the colonies, notwithſtanding the largeneſs of their boundaries, are in ſome meaſure cramped. It is of no ſmall conſequence then for our colonies to be delivered from ſuch hoſtilities; and this our northern colonies will be for 1000 miles and better, as all thoſe *Indians* that dwell near the river *St. Lawrence*, or the four lakes, will depend ſo upon our preſent colonies or *Canada*, as to oblige them to a good behaviour. The poſſeſſion of *Canada* will give ſecurity then againſt a number of *Indian* hoſtilities, and I know of no occaſion to erect any other kind of forts than block-houſes, for the traders to lodge their goods in with ſafety, and the defence of which may be left to ſuch traders. It will moreover give ſecurity to our northern colonies from all hoſtile attacks from the *French* in *Canada*, as theſe will commence by ſuch poſſeſſion *Engliſh* ſubjects; and that our negotiators in 1761, intended to prevent a future rupture upon account of the limits of *Canada*, appears from the precaution they gave into, for the ſettling of ſuch limits immediately. Indeed it does not give ſecurity to our ſouthern colonies of the *Carolina*'s and *Georgia*; but whoever looks upon a

map of *North America* may obſerve, that the limits inſiſted upon by our negotiators, ſecured to us not only all that lay on this ſide the *Ohio* 'till its confluence with the *Miſſiſſippi*, but a large tract of ſome hundred miles lying between the river *Ouabache* and the other ſide of the *Ohio*; and from the junction of theſe rivers to the *Miſſiſſippi* we were to poſſeſs all on this ſide. Thus the limits of *Canada* were to be fixed, and reached nearly as far to the ſouthward as *North Carolina*. That our negotiators were not unobſervant about the limits at the back of the *Carolina*'s and *Georgia*, appears by their not allowing the limits of *Louiſiana* delivered in a note by *M. de Buſſy*. Whether if the negotiation had proceeded, the *French* and *Engliſh* would have ſettled theſe limits ſo clearly as to have admitted of no future diſputes, I cannot aſcertain; but if this had not been done, and the limits been carried far enough back, a door would have been left open for a new war, and the ſouthern colonies would have been expoſed to attacks from *Louiſiana*. Our ſouthern colonies are repreſented by the *Examiner*, as more valuable than the northern, becauſe of the imports from the former being much larger than the imports from the latter. I have heard of perſons notions lying heels upwards. This ſeems to be the caſe with the *Examiner*'s notions of imports and exports; as tho' it was more to our advantage to be debtor than creditor, I would recommend it to him to ſtudy merchants accounts; but I am afraid that beſides this he needs a little honeſty, for tho'

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he has told us how ſuperior the imports from the ſouthern are, to the imports from the northern colonies, he has not mentioned a word of the ſuperiority of the exports to the latter. The ſouthern colonies are the weakeſt, but, whatever they may be when more peopled and better cultivated, they are not the moſt valuable. Being the weakeſt, and having powerful tribes of *Indians* at the back of them, it may be ſaid, that care ought to have been taken for their ſecurity. We cannot ſay, how far it might or might not have been done, had the negotiation proceeded: indeed, it could not have been done ſo effectually, while the *French* remained in poſſeſſion of the lands on this ſide the *Miſſiſſippi*, and it does not appear in the leaſt from the hiſtorical memorial, that we once thought of aſking or the *French* of giving up ſuch lands. But tho' our ſouthern colonies, the *Carolina*'s and *Georgia*, (I leave out *Virginia* and *Maryland*, as theſe were taken care of by carrying the limits of *Canada* down to the confluence of the *Ohio* with the *Miſſiſſippi*, within 30 miles of the line that divides *Virginia* and *North Carolina*) are the weakeſt, it ſhould be remembered that the *French* in *Louiſiana* are proportionably weak; and if proper care is taken to prevent the inhabitants of *Canada* from removing into *Louiſiana*, and to promote the population of theſe colonies, they will ſtrengthen more in proportion than the *French* in *Louiſiana*. Beſides, our northern colonies having nothing further to fear, we may find in them reſources of men

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ſufficient to repel the *Louiſianians* no ways equal in number to the *Canadians*; yea to act offenſively againſt them, ſhould it become neceſſary. The poſſeſſion of *Canada* will not give abſolute ſecurity to our continental colonies both northern and ſouthern, but this, and fixing proper limits at the back of the *Carolina*'s and *Georgia*, will give us all the ſecurity that the nature of affairs will admit of while *Louiſiana* remains to *France*, and will put things upon ſuch a footing, that, unleſs the *Britiſh* miniſtry ſhould be weak, timid, or criminally negligent, it will be extremely dangerous for the *French* to commit freſh hoſtilities, or to make any more encroachments upon the *North American* continent, laying the foundation for another war: but had *Canada* however bounded remained to *France*, we had made a fooliſh bargain tho' we had retained *Guadaloupe*, and a peace would only have ſuſpended our quarrel, inſtead of concluding it. Whatever hath been thrown out to leſſen *Canada* as a colony, it is not ſo inſignificant as pretended.

But to inſiſt upon the advantages to be drawn from *Canada* as a colony. The *Examiner* ſays *, Canada *may be of ſome advantage to us. I muſt confeſs I do not know what that advantage is*; and yet in another place †, he tells us that, *by the late treaty we ſhould have acquired* Canada, *worth annually* 14,015 l. 17 s. 1 d. But he will reconcile theſe different paſſages, by pleading that the expence of

* Page 95. † Page 60.

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keeping *Canada* will amount to 20,000 l. 'Whenever *Canada* becomes an *Engliſh* colony it muſt 'be defended by us.' True; and yet by its being ſo, we ſhall be at leſs expence than otherwiſe. We ſhall have to defend *Canada*, not from thoſe *Indians* that dwell at the back of our northern colonies, nor from thoſe that lie weſt of *Canada* with whom the *Canadians* are in alliance, but from all the attacks that the *French* may make upon it in future times with a view of regaining it; which we may do with the very ſame ſhipping that are employed in covering the coaſts of the other colonies. We muſt, conſidering that *Canada* is a conqueſt, maintain garriſons in ſome of the capital places: but by its being an *Engliſh* colony, we ſhall be freed from the charge of maintaining a number of other garriſons on the frontiers of our other colonies, and thereby make a ſaving; for which reaſon the defence of *Canada* ought not to be ſet at any thing: would it be an additional charge to us, then the increaſe of ſuch charge and no more ſhould be placed to its account. But beſides, whatever money our garriſons in *Canada* may coſt us, it will circulate back again, either directly or through our other colonies. As to the *Examiner*'s account of the imports from *Canada*, from *Chriſtmas* 1760, to *Chriſtmas* 1761, I queſtion its genuineneſs. It has been averred in the public papers, that they amounted to 70,000 l. for the truth of which the perſon appealed to the importers. It was alſo obſerved, that no account had been

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taken of the cargoes of the three *Canada* ſhips, which were taken and carried to *France*. Theſe ſhips had cargoes to the amount of 30,000 l. value. Now I doubt not, but that the *Examiner* would have replied to theſe things could he have done it, with as great alertneſs, as he reprimanded the editor of one of the papers *, for inſerting a note of his own, when giving an account of the *Examination*. If he hath replied to theſe things, I have not ſeen the reply. But whoever attends to his *Examination* may obſerve, that he had no deſign of giving us the real value of *Canada*. If he meant to acquaint us with it, he ſhould have favoured us with an account of the imports from *Canada* to *France*, before the commencement of the war, e'er the *Indians* were taken off from hunting beaver and deer, and clapped upon the *Engliſh* coloniſt. Doubtleſs he could have procured it, with as much eaſe, *as the original vouchers from the cuſtom-houſe of* Bourdeaux †, authenticating the account of *Weſt-Indian* produce exported from thence. But what anſwered his end in one caſe, would have injured his cauſe in another. Whether this ſame writer was, as hath been publickly aſſerted, the author of remarks upon the letter to two great men, comes not within the compaſs of my preſent knowledge: but the *Remarker* attempts not to depreciate the trade of *Canada* in other words than theſe, 'the 'whole trade of furs and ſkins, which *Canada* carri-

* See the *London Chronicle* for *Oct.* 23, P. 397. † Page 20.

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'ed on with *France*, fell ſhort in its moſt flouriſh-'ing ſtate of 140,000 l. a year.' This agrees tolerably well with what has been aſſerted of the imports, amounting the laſt year to 70,000 l. beſides cargoes loſt to the value of 30,000 l. making in the whole 100,000 l. We may ſet the yearly imports from *Canada*, upon an average, at 100,000 l. It cannot be eſtimated at leſs; for how can it be thought, that a colony of 40,000 inhabitants ſhould be in any tolerable circumſtances of eaſe without manufactures, unleſs it can ſend goods to this amount, to barter for thoſe it wants from the mother country. The *Remarker* tells us, 'the *French* 'have been long ſince convinced that this province '(of *Canada*) was of uſe to them, independent of 'their hopes of encroaching on our poſſeſſions. Aſk 'thoſe, Sir, who lately ſaw *Canada*, if it had the face 'of a colony which the mother country was weary 'of holding? I believe, Sir, they will tell you, 'that the cultivation of the lands, the number 'and neatneſs of the houſes, the warm condition 'of the inhabitants, by no means ſeemed to im-'ply, that they were neglected by *France*; but 'evinced, rather, that this colony was the object 'of her very tender concern.' This is an acknowledgment of the flouriſhing ſtate and good condition of *Canada*, and neceſſarily implies, that the imports from thence to *France* muſt be as conſiderable as what I have fixed them at, eſpecially when it's conſidered, that as the *Remarker* ſays, 'a very great part of the value of thoſe furs (which

'it ſends to *France*) is returned from *France* in the 'article of brandy, without which the trade with 'the *Indians* for their beaver and deer ſkins could 'not be carried on; and that the reſt of their pro-'duce, with regard to the market of *Europe*, is 'as nothing.' Suppoſing the brandy returned is worth 20,000 l. there remains only 80,000 l. to ſupply 40,000 inhabitants (which is but forty ſhillings a head) and to make their ſituation as agreeable as can well be imagined. But ſays the *Examiner* *, the inhabitants of *Penſylvania* do not take off much above the value of 20 s. a head. Very well, but then unhappily for him, he tells us † from *Douglas*, *that they manufacture, perhaps nine parts in ten of all they wear*; this is referred to the ſettlers, eſpecially the back ſettlers: he adds, they 'make linen even for exportation.' Now can any thing like this be ſaid of the *Canadians*. I have further to obſerve, that the very quantity of ſkins and furs, manufactured, uſed, and diſpoſed of by the *French*, before the war juſtifies my valuing the imports from *Canada* at not leſs than 100,000 l. This 100,000 l. will neceſſarily produce exports to the ſame value. But the imports from *Canada* are not valuable *only* as they produce exports in return. Theſe imports conſiſting of furs, ſkins, &c. are of vaſt advantage to ſeveral of our manufactures, and will ſecure to our country almoſt the whole of ſome particular branches of trade. It

* Page 107. † Page 80.

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muſt be remembered alſo, that whatever advantage we have from *Canada* is loſt to *France*. It is ſo much taken from her and added to us, which doubles the difference. Hitherto we have attended only to the ſkin and fur trade of *Canada*. I come now to remark, that by poſſeſſing *Canada* with the iſlands in the gulph of *St. Lawrence*, we increaſe the dependance of the *French Weſt-Indies* upon our colonies, and ſecure to ourſelves the advantages that *Canada* had by trading with them. The *French* had no other northern colony, from whence to ſupply their iſlands with lumber, corn, and proviſion. Theſe are articles abſolutely neceſſary for them; and they muſt have them either from *Canada* or our other colonies; whatever then they expended in theſe with the *Canadians*, will be gained to us, either in our colony of *Canada*, or the adjacent ones: not only ſo, but by keeping *Canada*, we put it out of the power of *France* to raiſe this colony to ſuch a flouriſhing ſtate, as to ruin that extenſive trade, that our continental colonies carry on with the *French Weſt-Indies* for lumber, proviſion, &c. which it would ſoon have done, when once it could have anſwered the demand of the *French Weſt-Indies* for theſe particulars. The *French* would have prohibited their planters trading with our colonies, when once they could have been ſupplied from *Canada*: and the *French* would have been wanting to their own intereſts, if they had not laboured to bring that colony into a ſituation admitting of it. As the ceſſion of *Canada* will ſe-

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cure the peaceable poſſeſſion of our northern colonies, ſo of their extenſive trade to the *French* iſlands, which tho' moſt profitable to the colonies is extremely profitable to the mother country. What hath been mentioned, I hope will ſhew, that *Canada* as a colony, will be of no ſmall importance; and yet, I have other things to add greatly in its favour. It is an improveable eſtate, which if properly managed will turn to a moſt excellent account. Nothing but the moſt conſummate ignorance or impudence, could have led the *Examiner* to ſay, that Canada * *proper lies in a climate abſolutely incapable of furniſhing any one of the commodities*, that the advocates for keeping it, *pretend to raiſe*. The northernmoſt boundary lying upon the river *St. Lawrence* in 49° latitude, is more to the ſouthward than any part of *Great Britain*, or than thoſe *Ruſſian* dominions from which we are ſupplied with hemp; and therefore may in time furniſh with this commodity; and if *this commodity in our old ſettlements, in climates full as favourable to its growth, never has hitherto been cultivated to any advantage, but has even reſiſted parliamentary encouragements and bounties, almoſt equal to its native value* †, it has been owing to the coloniſt's being able to make better of his lands by employing them in agriculture, tobacco, or the like, or to there not being ſufficient hands, or to the junction of both theſe cauſes. As to the advantage, that our old

* Page 81. † Page 77.

ſettle-



ſettlements have, by being ſituated near the ſea, it is not *infinitely* ſuperior to what the *Canadians* enjoy from the river *St. Lawrence*, and others that empty themſelves into it. From the northernmoſt boundary of *Canada* on this river up to *Montreal* it is 360 miles; and whoever examines *Mitchell*'s map of *North America*, will find, that there are a number of fine rivers between theſe two extremities, which appear free from falls and flats, and capable of admitting of an inland navigation for many miles up the country. I will allow with the *Examiner*, that, making the boundary of our colonies to run along the river *St. Lawrence*, from thence all along to the ſouthward of the lakes, and ſo down the river *St. Jerome* or *Ouabache*, *we have, independent of* Canada proper, *land more than ſufficient for every ſort of product, which the moſt ſanguine ſchemiſt can imagine* *. But he muſt be a moſt extraordinary ſchemiſt indeed, who could ſuppoſe, that theſe lands, which border upon *Canada*, would be improved to any purpoſe, while that remained to the *French*; or that we had hands enow to improve them properly. Would any number of people have ventured to ſettle on the eaſtern ſide of *St. Lawrence*, at a great diſtance from the moſt populous parts of our colonies, with a view of raiſing hemp, while the *French* poſſeſſed the other ſide of it? Or would they have done it, 'till the whole ſea coaſt had been ſettled? But this is not yet ſet-

* Page 81.

tled,

tled, in *Nova Scotia*, neither will be for many years to come. We wanted not only ſecurity for our colonies, but inhabitants to make further improvements; and both theſe we have by keeping *Canada*. The *Canadians* have not only the weſtern ſide of the river *St. Lawrence*, but the eaſtern (now that they are become *Engliſh* ſubjects) down to the northernmoſt part of *Nova Scotia*, to favour the raiſing of hemp, and opening a trade with us for any other enumerated commodities; and neceſſity, together with parliamentary encouragement, will put them in a few years upon procuring ſuch commodities. Our other colonies upon the ſea coaſt, by reaſon of their ſuperior advantages, will ſhut out *Canada* from having any great ſhare in the trade to the *Weſt-Indies* or any other place, where their articles of commerce are the ſame. The *Canadians* muſt therefore apply themſelves to thoſe branches of trade, in which our other colonies will not interfere with them, ſuch as naval ſtores, pitch, tar, turpentine, iron, copper ore, hemp, and oil. They may trade in theſe without danger of rivalſhip; and if encouraged by parliament for a while, will ſoon find their account in doing it. But a ſmall part of their country will be improved without they do it, as a ſmall part will grow all the corn wanted for their ſupport, and by reaſon of their ſituation, they cannot ſupply diſtant markets with proviſion articles, upon the ſame eaſy terms with our other colonies. They have no choice; either they muſt apply themſelves to theſe branches, or their whole trade



trade muſt be confined to ſkins and furs, and the greateſt part of *Canada* be of no advantage to them. I have allowed, that, without *Canada* reduced within the bounds mentioned by the *Examiner*, we have land more than ſufficient for every ſort of product; but then, a great part of this land muſt have remained an uncultivated tract, ſo long as *France* was poſſeſſed of what he ſtiles *Canada* proper. The lands of *Nova Scotia*, and *New England*, for 480 miles from the gulph of *St. Lawrence* to *Montreal*, would neceſſarily have been encroached, becauſe of their being in a bad neighbourhood. The ſame objection would have prevailed againſt the *New York* lands from *Montreal* to lake *Ontario* for 160 miles. The back parts of *Penſylvania*, and the lands on the *Ohio*, lie far from the coaſts and beyond the mountains, and therefore according to the *Examiner*, can be of no great ſervice; who, after arguing the point for ſome time *, comes to this concluſion, *that inland colonies can never prove in any conſiderable degree beneficial to our commerce* †. This concluſion I cannot aſſent to; for, let inland colonies be at a conſiderable diſtance from the coaſt, yet by the help of water-carriage they may prove extremely beneficial to commerce. And thus would it be with a colony on the banks of the *Ohio*, for this river by reaſon of its gentle current is navigable either up or down, from its ſource to its influx, with only one fall near its conflux, with the

* Page 78, 79. † Page 81.

*Ouabache*,

*Ouabache*, and from the *Mohongalo* that empties itſelf into the *Ohio* to *Wills*'s *Creek* on the north branch of the *Potowmack* it is but ſixty miles, ſo that a communication may be eſtabliſhed between the banks of the *Ohio* and the ſea-coaſts of *Virginia*, without its being attended with ſuch a length of land-carriage, as to render it unſerviceable, and of this the *Ohio* company was ſenſible, when they obtained their charter in 1749. A conſiderable advantage may be made of an inland colony on the banks of the *Ohio*, if ſuch can be eſtabliſhed, notwithſtanding all that the *Examiner* talks of 'aſcending the ſtreams that fall from the weſtern 'ſide of the mountains, of deſcending thoſe that 'fall from the eaſtern, of rifts and falls, of often 'unloading and reloading,' by means of which, he cunningly aggravates difficulties, 'till his reader believes them to be inſurmountable. We may now people that rich, flat, fertile country, through which the *Ohio* winds its gentle courſe, and make it ſubſervient to our commerce: we may do it ſafely, as *Canada* remains to *England*, and the ſettlers will have nothing to fear from the *Canadians*. It may poſſibly be ſaid, that *Canada* proper lies at a great diſtance from the lands upon the *Ohio*; but the firſt article of the anſwer of *England* to the *ultimatum* of *France*, acknowledges the contrary, when it ſays, '*Canada* comprehending, agreeable 'to the line of limits drawn by *M. de Vaudreuil* 'himſelf, when he gave up the province by ca-'pitulation, on one ſide the lakes *Iburon*, *Michigon*,

'and



'and *Superior*; and the ſaid line, drawn from lake '*Rouge*, comprehending by a winding courſe the 'river *Ouabache* to its junction with the *Ohio*, and 'from thence ſtretching along this laſt river inclu-'ſively to its confluence with the *Miſſiſſippi*.' This article is ſo darkly expreſſed, that it is ſcarce to be known from it, whether this line of limits is the boundary of *Canada* to the eaſt or weſt; if to the weſt, it carries in it an acknowledgment that the lands on this ſide the *Ouabache* towards the *Ohio* were a part of *Canada*; if to the eaſt, then the weſtern boundary ſhould have been ſpecified: but I take it to be the weſtern. By this time the reader will begin to think that I have forgotten the point in hand, and yet I truſt he will allow the contrary, when I have obſerved, that, whatever improvements may now be made of our recovered rights which could not have been made had *Canada* remained to the *French*, ſhews the importance of *Canada* as an *Engliſh* colony. And now what little occaſion is there for decrying *Canada* under the notion of *a vaſt but unprofitable foreſt*, *extenſive but unprofitable empire*. Should we reckon to *Canada* the iſlands in the gulph of *St. Lawrence*, then we muſt put into the account all the diſadvantages and loſſes that the *French* fiſhery ſuſtains through their not having theſe iſlands.

But to inſiſt upon GUADALOUPE. That the exports and imports to and from this iſland, was it to remain to us, would for ſeveral years exceed our trade with *Canada* cannot be doubted. But the

value of a trade is not to be eſtimated merely by the coſt of the commodities exchanged in it. Should the commodities exported from one place coſt double the commodities from another, yet if theſe laſt are of double advantage to our manufactures, then the only ſuperiority on either ſide lies in the greater quantity of ſhipping that is employed. The imports from *Guadaloupe* may be divided into eatables and raw materials to be wrought up in our manufactures. The value of the latter, amounts to better than 100,000 l. the ſum at which I have fixed the imports from *Canada:* but then it muſt be obſerved, that *Canada* will admit of much greater improvements than *Guadaloupe*, and may in time furniſh us with materials amounting to more than the whole imports from the latter; the far greateſt part of which conſiſt of eatables. If theſe are conſumed at home, it will be in conſequence of their growing cheaper than at preſent; but if they cheapen, the value of the imports will neceſſarily be ſunk. If they are exported; and our balance to other ſtates is proportionably diminiſhed, they will certainly be of great advantage to us. But if inſtead of paying our debts, they ſerve only to bring in needleſs and luxurious articles, they will even prove a detriment to us; notwithſtanding the advantages gained by carrying them to and fro, factorage and the like; for it will be much the ſame as tho' they had been imported from *France* and paid for by our caſh, 'till the planter has loſt all his affection for his mother country, and



and inclines to ſpend his fortunes in *Great Britain:* the only difference will be our furniſhing the planter with the exports. We import from *Guadaloupe* ſugars to the amount of 400,000 l. we look upon the whole as clear gain, and inſtead of applying it towards paying off where the balance is againſt us, we export it in return for uſeleſs and unprofitable articles, which increaſe not the real ſtock of the nation, and which we ſhould otherwiſe have done without: we pay the planter the 400,000 l. as we cannot ſend him the caſh, he comes over and receives it, transforms it into bullion or its equivalent, carries it over to *France*, for which he hath a natural affection, and there ſpends it. Thus would it be with the planter or planters for a generation at leaſt, was *Guadaloupe* to remain to *Great Britain*; 'till a new race, and a long intercourſe with *Britain* had obliterated the thoughts of their original extraction. Hence we may gather the weakneſs of the *Examiner*'s aſſertion in the cloſe of the following paragraph *, *The* French *inhabitants of* Guadaloupe *have moſt certainly at this day in their poſſeſſion more gold in ſpecie, than is to be found in all our other* Leward iſlands *put together. The far greater part of this treaſure muſt, immediately upon a peace, of neceſſity in one tide flow in upon that country which ſhall then be maſter of* Guadaloupe. Did *Guadaloupe* remain to *Great Britain*, the balance of trade would be ſo much in favour of the former,

* Page 54, note at bottom.

that ſhe would not want to expend any of this treaſure for our commodities; for if the imports from thence amount to 600,000 l. and the exports, with the negroes included, to leſs than 250,000 l. there remains 350,000 l. for her to ſpend,, before ſhe will want to touch this treaſure. And the *French* inhabitants of *Guadaloupe* would never come and ſpend it in *England*; no, but would retire to *France* with it. In like manner would they do with regard to the balance they might receive in the way of trade, tho' they might be obliged to come firſt to *England* for ſuch balance. This ſeems to have been wholly overlooked by the Advocates for *Guadaloupe*, who have thought that there would be no difference between our own *Weſt Indian* planters and the *French*, when once the latter were become *Engliſh* ſubjects, as tho' this would, to all intents and purpoſes, make them *Engliſhmen*. The *Examiner* tells us *, that the produce of *Guadaloupe* amounted from *Chriſtmas* 1760, to *Chriſtmas* 1761, to 603,269 l. 3s. 9d. and ſets † the exports, including the purchace of negroes, at 238,569 l. 5 s. 10 d. and endeavours to perſuade his reader, that was it to remain to us, there would be a conſiderable increaſe in both the imports and exports. But though the imports amounted to more than 600,000 l. the produce might be much leſs. In order to have known the produce of *Guadaloupe*, we ſhould have been in-

* Page 42. † P. 52.

formed



formed what were the annual imports upon an average from thence to *France* before the commencement of the war. The imports of 1761 might be increaſed by a ſtock in hand, which had not been diſpoſed of the preceding year, from an apprehenſion that the *Engliſh* market would not prove a good one *, and by the *French* Prize goods purchaſed by the inhabitants; for the *Examiner* acquaints us †, tho' with quite different views, *that* Guadaloupe *has been the market for all the* French *prize goods taken in the* Weſt Indies. As to negroes, its a queſtion whether *Guadaloupe* would have continued taking off 4000 a year; the *Examiner* owns ‡, *that ſcarce any part of it is fully ſlaved*; which might be the reaſon of its purchaſing ſo many this year; the planter might alſo be inclined to buy the more freely, from the imagination of his returning ſoon under the dominion of his former ſovereign; and then being unable to purchaſe upon terms equally advantageous. As to the improvements that might be made of *Guadaloupe* in future years, it is at preſent a matter of ſpeculation, and not of fact, and the *Examiner* hath in divers places diſcovered his diſlike to ſpeculations. In his account of *Guadaloupe* he alſo takes notice, *that the two ports of* Glaſgow *and* Leith *in* Scotland *have carried on a conſiderable trade with this iſland, and that a great number of ſhips, and ſome very valuable ones, have been taken*

* This thought is confirmed by the low-ſtate of its trade immediately after its reduction in 1759. † P. 51. ‡ P. 48.

by

*by the enemy, coming from* Guadaloupe *to* England, *which ought to be taken into the account.* Here I am put upon aſking, whether in the exports and imports to and from *North America*, thoſe of *Scotland* were included? And whether the many ſhips, and ſome very valuable ones, taken by the enemy, going to or fro, ought not alſo to be taken account of? But when the advocates for *Guadaloupe* have ſaid all, what has been obſerved concerning the imports from thence, if exported for uſeleſs articles, and the planters going to *France* with the balance, will hold good; ſo that it's egregious folly to talk of its being *an acquiſition worth at this moment above* 600,000 l. *a year to our direct* Britiſh *trade* *; as tho' there was no difference between the trade between *Britain* and *Guadaloupe*'s amounting to better than 600,000 l. a year, and being worth as much to the *Britiſh* trade. Such perſons, inſtead of reckoning the *profits* of the trade, make the *whole trade profit*. The cotton of *Guadaloupe* is doubtleſs an important article, but there's no call for keeping the iſland for want of territory ſuited to the growth of this commodity, of which I ſhall make mention elſewhere. Thus I have delivered my thoughts upon TRADE in general, our WEST-INDIAN in particular, our CONTINENTAL COLONIES, CANADA, and GUADALOUPE, and hope, that in doing it, I have vindicated the conduct of the honourable perſons employed in the negotiation of

* P. 102, 67, 68, 69.

1761,



1761, and ſhewn, that they knew what they were about better than the author of the Examination of it did, when he engaged in that ſervice. The *Examiner*, ſenſible of the injury offered thoſe honourable perſons, apologizes for them after a moſt extraordinary manner, ſo as to increaſe his crime; for when his reader hath finiſhed the apology, he is brought to think, either that ſuch honourable perſons were ignorant of the true intereſt of the publick, had their attention turned off from it by the cry about *Canada*, and our continental colonies, or to humour ſuch cry and pleaſe the publick, knowingly ſacrificed their true intereſt. The apology is more reproachful than the inſult that occaſioned it. There are ſeveral other things in the *Examination* that might be remarked upon, but I am tired with the performance; however, let me make a few quotations from it, which I am at a loſs to reconcile with each other. They are theſe, *the late negotiation, ſo far as it regarded our colonies and commerce, was on our ſide conducted, I apprehend, on one ſingle idea,* viz. *to ſecure to ourſelves the poſſeſſion of all* Canada *. *The reader will not entertain any doubt, that the treaty was conducted on a principle wholly averſe to* Weſt-Indian *acquiſition* †. *A preference and a rejection, which could by no poſſibility have ariſen from any other ſource, than the maxim which appears to have then governed our councils,* viz. *that the* Weſt-Indies *were a part of the world in which we ought to aſpire at nothing.*

* P. 8. † P. 9.

The

*The ſtamp of this maxim is impreſſed on every part of the treaty* *. *The reſolution, however it came to prevail, that we ought not to extend our trade, or our empire in the* Weſt-Indies †. *This very groundleſs opinion* (concerning *Canada* and our continental colonies) *was the true ſource of our neglect, in the late negotiation, of ſuch real commercial advantages, as might augment the reſources of* Great Britain ‡. The curious reader will poſſibly be deſirous of knowing who the *Examiner* is; I muſt own myſelf wholly incapable of giving him the proper information; but if I was to conjecture ſhould imagine, either he or his employer is perſonally intereſted in *Guadaloupe*'s remaining to *England*, and is better acquainted with the trade of that iſland than of our own.

I would now congratulate my country upon the preliminaries of peace, was it not unfaſhionable, and would it not make me ſuſpected of favouring the preſent miniſtry, after having been employed in defending our great Commoner, and of being a *Scot* under covert. However, to ſhew that I am a true *Engliſhman*, and am not afraid of ſpeaking my mind, I heartily congratulate them upon this occaſion, and to juſtify myſelf in this ſingularity, I will aſſign ſome reaſons for it.

When I look back to the year 1757, and conſider what was then our ſituation, I am amazed and thankful, that our dominions will at a peace be ſo enlarged and ſecured, and ſuch a wide door

* Page 11. † Page 13. ‡ Page 69.

be



we had reaſon to fear that both would be greatly contracted. Yea, all ranks of people were ſo diſpirited and terrified, that they could ſcarce ſleep ſoundly in their beds, for fear of invaſions, and would have been ready to have agreed with our enemy upon any terms, ſo that they could have ſecured their lives and liberties. What are the preſent preliminaries, compared with what they muſt have been, had our affairs been as badly conducted throughout, as at the beginning of the war, before our great Commoner was employed, and proved the means of recovering *us* out of our fright, and *our affairs* out of their woful condition.

It is with national ſucceſs as with the ſun, each hath its meridian; whether ours had reached it no one knows; but had the war continued, and the event ſhewn that it had paſſed it, the uneven ſpirits of the nation had been ſunk, and we ſhould have been glad of a peace upon much better terms for the enemy. A conſiderable miſcarriage or two would have frightened us almoſt into deſpondency, and we ſhould have dreaded one misfortune upon the back of another. Such is the temper of our country. When I conſider this, I am rejoiced, that we ſhall get out of the war with ſo much honour and advantage.

Had we refuſed making peace upon the preſent terms, and our enemies ſubmitting to any worſe, the war muſt have continued: but a peace on theſe terms is better than to have run the hazard of another campaign. We have every year expected,

 that

that the *French*, by the great ſuperiority of their numbers, would prevail againſt the army of the allies, tho' commanded by one of the ableſt generals of the age: and have been ſurprized at finding that they have been baffled. Would it have been ſurprizing then, if at length they had carried their point! I will venture to ſay, that very few would have wondered at it, while almoſt all had wondered, that they had not carried it before. Had our affairs required it, we could have had little or no aſſiſtance from *Pruſſia*; he would either have had full employ for his troops in oppoſing the *Auſtrians*; or would have loſt no opportunity of giving them a home thruſt when he had got them at an advantage, in order to have helped us, when there was no more ſubſidy treaty exiſting, and we had ſo much in hand with which to make reſtitution. Would it not have been too great a venture to have refuſed agreeing to the preſent terms, and to have proſecuted the war, when attended in different places with ſo much uncertainty, even the improbability of ſucceſs: I ſay, different places, with a view to *Portugal*. The *Spaniards*, humanly ſpeaking, muſt have made themſelves maſters of it, in another campaign. And however ſome may talk, we muſt have parted with more or leſs of our conqueſts to have redeemed it. It is really diverting to hear it ſaid, that had the *Spaniards* conquered and retained *Portugal*, we ſhould have been gainers by it, as we ſhould have had a direct trade to *Braſil*. It is not only *likely* and *highly probable* then,



then, but *certain*, that the king of *Portugal* would have continued his friendſhip for us, and have favoured us with a trade to the *Braſils*, though we had refuſed giving back ſome of our conqueſts to the common enemy, in order to recover his kingdom. *Riſum teneatis amici!* Would he not rather, finding what an ungenerous ally he had to do with, have made a friend of *France*, by promiſing her the whole woollen trade, have given up all regards for our intereſt, and have extricated himſelf out of the war as well as poſſible. The importance of *Portugal*, and our trade with her, is well known to the manufacturers, and may be perceived by all that can recollect, how the Ports prevailed among us before and at the beginning of the war, 'till ſent to *Germany*, melted down and coined into guineas. They that will ſacrifice nothing for the benefit of allies, will never have allies that are worth any thing: and to think, that, becauſe we are an iſland, we have no concern with the affairs of the continent, is to forget that we trade with the continent, and is to claim that independency that is inconſiſtent with the preſent ſyſtem of the univerſe. How ſhould we have blamed ourſelves, had a change in our affairs, or thoſe of our allies, reduced us to the diſagreeable neceſſity of complying in 1763, with what we have not complied with in 1762. To adapt my language to the ideas of too numerous a part of the community, I hug myſelf, that we are got from the table with ſo much booty, e'er a run of ill luck had taken place.

We ſhall retain in our hands, more than we ſhould have done, had we made peace upon our own terms the preceding year. Beſides, the propoſed acquiſitions of that year, we ſhall have an immenſe tract of country lying between the lakes *Superior* and *Michigan*, the river *Ouobache* to its junction with the *Ohio*, and the *Ohio* from thence to the *Miſſiſſippi* on the one ſide, and the head of the *Miſſiſſippi* to its forks on the other. This tract contains many thouſand ſquare miles, and runs from *North* to *South* near as low as *North Carolina*. We have the free navigation of the river *Miſſiſſippi*, ſo that this tract might be made uſeful to us, could we tell how to peop e it. But the navigation of the *Miſſiſſippi* is of the greateſt importance, as it opens an eaſy communication with the *Ouabeche*, the *Ohio*, and the *Hogohegee* or *Cherokees*, whereby all the objections made againſt improving the lands adjoining to one or other of theſe rivers, by reaſon of their lying beyond the mountains, and ſo far back from the coaſt, are removed. The lands of the *Ohio* will be greatly increaſed in value by means of this inland navigation down to the gulph of *Mexico*. We are farther to have all that the *French* claimed or poſſeſſed to the eaſt of the *Miſſiſſippi* at the back of the *Carolina's* and *Georgia*, excepting the town of *New Orleans*, and the iſland in which it is ſituated, containing a prodigious large tract of country, though not equal to that beforementioned, but likely to be much more uſeful, by reaſon of its



its being more to the ſouthward, lying nearer to the ſea, and for three hundred miles bordering upon it. In the ſouthermoſt part of this tract, we have that continental land, I doubt not, which will admit of and favour the growth of the ſugar cane. Becauſe ſugars are grown chiefly between the tropics, ſome from thence weakly conclude, that they will grow no where elſe: but experience ſhews us, that the ſame article will grow in very different climates, and why ſhould it not be ſo with regard to ſugars; yea, we have been told, that the inhabitants of *Louiſiana* have actually raiſed this commodity; ſhould inquiry ſhew this report to be falſe, it is certainly incumbent upon us to make the trial, and we are encouraged to do it from hence, that the ſouthernmoſt part of the *Louiſianian* tract ceded to us, is not ſo far from the *French* quarter of *St. Domingo*, as *Surinam*. But ſhould it be found after trial, that the ſugar cane cannot be cultivated in theſe parts to an advantage, what ſhould hinder its being cultivated in the ſouthernmoſt part of *Florida*, about eight degrees more to the *North* than *Jamaica*? If cotton can grow where ſugar does, as in *Guadaloupe*, why cannot ſugar grow where cotton does? Cotton, we are informed by geographers, grows wild in *Florida*. But all this time I have not obſerved, that by the preſent peace we are to have all *Florida* about three hundred miles long, and upon an average one hundred broad, ſo that we have the whole *North American* coaſt for our own, and the whole country as far

far back as to the *Miſſiſſippi*. We are alſo to retain the iſlands of *Grenada* and the *Grenadines*, and are to have three, inſtead of two, of the neutral iſlands. It may be ſaid, that the *French* are to have the iſle of *Miquelon* on the coaſt of *Newfoundland*, which was not allowed them by the laſt treaty. Very true; but this iſland the *French* deemed of ſo little importance, that they tell us in the hiſtorical memorial of the negotiation, that the Duke *de Choiſeul* declared it ſhould not be inſiſted upon. However, I wiſh it had not been granted, as I am for giving *France* nothing by way of complaiſance, for fear ſhe ſhould retaliate as the viper in the fable. With regard to *St. Lucia*, which is to be reſtored to *France*, it does not appear, but that would have been conſented to the laſt year. As to *Goree*, it was refuſed by the former negotiation, and ſome other expedient was to be thought of. Every one muſt ſee, that by the preſent treaty, we are to hold much more than we ſhould have gained by that of the preceding year. 'Tis a matter of fact then, that by the preſent preliminaries we are better off, than we ſhould have been had we made peace the laſt year upon our own terms, even though it ſhould be thought that theſe preliminaries are not adequate to our ſucceſſes. It may be objected, that we have been loaded with the expence of millions in conſequence of the war's having been continued and enlarged. This neceſſarily followed, from our ſtanding upon higher terms than *France* would agree to, and our refuſing to comply with the unjuſtifiable

demands



demands of *Spain*. But are the expences only on our ſide, have not both the *French* and *Spaniards* had their expences, and have not the captures made upon the laſt paid us well for the extraordinary charge they have put us to. We have got conſiderably from them, to the amount of millions in goods, ſhipping and caſh; not only ſo, but we have obliged them to give up their claim to the *Newfoundland* fiſhery, to allow us the free and unmoleſted liberty of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood, and to cede us *Florida*.

I ſhould have been very well pleaſed, could we have kept the *Havanna*, *Goree*, *Martinico*, *Guadaloupe*, and *St. Lucia*, all or any of them: but I am not diſpleaſed though we reſtore them, when I recollect how much we ſecure to ourſelves. We have never been noted for making a good peace, for theſe many years; it has been uſually the caſe, that our intereſts have been ſacrificed to the benefit of our allies. It muſt be ſome ſatisfaction therefore to conſiderate perſons, that we have improved in the arts of negotiation, though it ſhould not appear that we are as yet adepts. It muſt be acknowledged by all, that our negotiators have taken ample care to prevent all future quarrels between us, the *French*, and *Spaniards*, with regard to limits on the continent; and that they have ſettled the affair of the logwood trade; but I cannot find in the preliminaries a word about the *Spaniards* examining or not, with their guarda coaſtas, our trading ſhips as they paſs and repaſs in the *American* ſeas; this

point

point ought to be the more carefully ſettled, as we ſhall navigate thoſe ſeas more than ever, by reaſon of our poſſeſſing all on this ſide the *Miſſiſippi*. I hope, the miniſtry will give it proper attention before the definitive treaty is concluded. There is alſo no mention made of the ſhips taken from *France* before the declaration of war. The honour of the nation requires, that this matter ſhould be ſo ſettled, as that *France*'s commencing hoſtilities in *America* ſhould warrant our commencing hoſtilities in *Europe*. Care hath been taken to demoliſh the family compact by the twenty-third article, which renews former treaties inconſiſtent with it.

But to make a few remarks, with reſpect to the places to be reſtored. One would be apt to ſuppoſe, from what ſome ſay of the *Havanna*, that had this remained to us, it would have been an amazing fund of wealth to our nation. So far from it, that unleſs we had applied ourſelves to the cultivation of the country, it would no more have paid the expence of keeping, than *Minorca*. The intercourſe between *that*, *Cartagena*, *Puerto Bello*, and *Vera Cruz* had been at an end. The galleons had no longer made it the place of rendezvous, and then it had been ſoon impoveriſhed. If we had retained the *Havanna*, we ſhould not have been allowed to have traded with the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, and ſo ſhould have miſſed of our imaginary gains. Unleſs with the harbour we could have had the trade with the other dominions of *Spain* in thoſe ſeas, we ſhould have done the *Spaniard* a conſiderable damage



mage by keeping it, without doing ourſelves any good. The main and almoſt only benefit it could be of to us, would be in war-time, as it would prove an excellent harbour for our ſhipping, and in caſe of a rupture with *Spain* would endanger their galleons. But what! is there no place either on the eaſtern or weſtern coaſt of *Florida*, or on the coaſt that runs from *Florida* to the *Miſſiſippi*, where we might make a harbour? Is there no bay from *St. Auguſtin* all round *Florida* to the iſland of *New Orleans*, an extent of nine hundred miles, where we might have a ſafe port for our ſhips to run into, careen and repair? The bay of *Mobile* and the bay of *Penſacola* make a fine appearance in the map, and if they have a good entrance and proper depth of water will afford our ſhipping all the ſhelter wanted, and by lying in the gulf of *Mexico* will, in caſe of a freſh rupture with *Spain*, favour our views upon the galleons. I cannot but think, that, within that length of 300 miles of coaſt on the gulf of *Mexico* that *France* cedes to us, we may find a convenient ſpot where to erect docks, and yards, for the ſervice of our navy in thoſe parts, and that may ſupply the place of the *Havanna*. This at leaſt ought to be examined into. As to the *Havanna*, while it would be of no great advantage to us in a time of peace, it would be of ſuch detriment to the *Spaniards*, that they would ſcarce have conſented to any peace but upon condition of its being reſtored; and tho' *Florida* is not an equivalent to them, it may be

made almoſt of as much, if not of more conſequence to the *Engliſh*. Beſides, by reſtoring the *Havanna*, we ſettle the diſpute about the fiſhery and logwood trade, and recover to our ally of *Portugal* the places that *Spain* hath taken from him.

*Goree* hath been repreſented as neceſſary to the ſecurity of *Senegal*, and it hath been argued, that for this reaſon, it ſhould have been retained; and yet, *Senegal* was taken *May* 1, 1758, and *Goree* not 'till *December* 29, two different expeditions were ſet on foot againſt them at diſtant periods, and the mouth of the river *Sanaga* is full a hundred miles to the northward of *Goree*. Can it be thought, that the laſt is neceſſary to the ſecurity of *Senegal*, or can afford ſuch ſecurity, when it lies at ſuch a diſtance from it, and when we were not obliged to reduce that, e'er we had taken the other, inſtead of, before we attacked the other! They that will believe againſt inferences fairly deducted from facts, are too far gone to be argued with *.

That we ſhould have kept *Martinico*, *Guadaloupe*, and *St. Lucia*, is not argued for, except by thoſe that are for keeping all that we have conquered. But many think, that we ſhould have retained either *Guadaloupe* or *St. Lucia*, or both. And what, and if the *French* would not have conſented to it, and we had been obliged to have pro-

* I ſay nothing of the importance of *Senegal*, as the vigorous endeavours of our merchants to prevent the monopoly of its trade are an indiſputable proof of it.





longed the war, and our affairs had taken a new and unhappy turn! This is uot thought of. We have been ſo uſed for years to ſucceſs, that it does not once enter our minds that we may poſſibly meet with rebuffs. But what is thought of, is the advantage that we might reap from the poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe* and *St. Lucia*. The latter may have a fine harbour, and may therefore ſeem neceſſary; but we have in *Granada* one, if not equally fine, as fine * as is wanted; and it's certain, that tho' we have wanted the harbour of *St. Lucia*, we have done without it hitherto. The want of ſuch a one may have ſubjected us to ſome difficulties, but ſtill we have done very well notwithſtanding; and nothing can be a better proof, of its not being ſo very neceſſary as what ſome would inſinuate. Tho' we have not had this port to repair to in the hurricane ſeaſon, I do not recollect that we have loſt a ſingle ſhip in conſequence thereof, the whole war. *Guadaloupe* would have without doubt been of great uſe to us; and yet not of ſuch uſe as the advocates for keeping it pretend; this hath been ſhown above under the article of *Guadaloupe*. With

* The principal port, called *Lewis*, ſtands in the middle of a large bay on the weſt ſide of the iſland, which has a ſandy bottom, where a thouſand barks from three to four hundred tons may ride ſafe from ſtorms, and the harbour will hold a hundred ſhips of a thouſand tons moored. By reaſon of a ſand bank great ſhips are obliged to paſs within 80 paces of one of the two little mountains which are at the mouth of the harbour, and half a mile or thereabouts aſunder.

regard to cotton, the main particular in which for the preſent it would have been uſeful to us, I have obſerved that it grows wild in *Florida*. Now there is no proportion between *Florida* and *Guadaloupe* as to ſize, the former being ſo much larger than the latter. We may argue from the cottons growing wild in *Florida* that the ſoil is natural to it, and that of courſe it may be eaſily cultivated, and will pay well for the trouble. Why then ſhould we deſire to retain *Guadaloupe* for the ſake of its cotton! Rather let us promote the ſettling of *Florida*. The enſuing peace will cut off the means of ſupport from thouſands—thouſands that have been employed in fighting our battles for us. Let our acquiſitions be peopled with colonies out of this body of brave men. Let every encouragement be given to thoſe of them that are married, or that will marry, and go to ſettle abroad. And what can be a more ſuitable *place* than *Florida*, or *employ* than the cultivation of cotton. When once the ground is cleared, they will have little difficulty in cultivating it, the ſoil being natural to it. They may ſow and gather it themſelves; and a number of children would in a few years, inſtead of being a burden to them, be of conſiderable ſervice. They might cultivate this commodity, notwithſtanding the lowneſs of their circumſtances, and be ſoon able to maintain themſelves without any further help from the government than protection. But I muſt not overlook the addition of ſugar land, that we ſhould have gained by retaining



ing *Guadaloupe* and *St Lucia*; and that more ſugar land is wanted than what our former *Weſt-Indian* iſlands contained, I am ready to allow. I have mentioned the neceſſity of continental land capable of producing ſugars, and have ſpecified where I apprehend we have that land; I would now obſerve, that by the preſent preliminaries we increaſe our inſular ſugar land in the *Weſt-Indies* conſiderably.

Notwithſtanding our claim upon the neutral iſlands, the *French* were in poſſeſſion of them; whereas now we ſhall have three out of four in our own hands. Before we had only our title to them, which was diſputed; but now, by entering upon them, there is an actual addition of ſo much to our *Weſt-Indian* territory. This addition is not trifling. *Dominica* is about 32 miles in length and 12 in breadth. *Tobago* is about 36 miles in length, 12 in breadth, and 90 in circumference. St. *Vincent* is ſtill larger, by the acknowledgment of the *Examiner* *. Either of theſe iſlands is bigger than St. *Lucia*. In time of peace, the ſituation of theſe iſlands will be of no diſadvantage to them; and in time of war, that which protects our other iſlands from being conquered, will ſuffice to protect them, notwithſtanding the neighbourhood of the *French* iſlands, *viz.* the ſuperiority of our navy. But beſides having the actual poſſeſſion of the above neutral iſlands, we are to

* Page 63.

have

have *Grenada* about 75 miles in circumference, together with the adjacent ſmall iſlands called the *Grenadines*; and in *Grenada*, as hath been above obſerved, we ſhall have a moſt excellent harbour. It may be feared, that by making the reſtitutions we have agreed to, and by ſuffering the *French* to have a ſhare in the fiſhery, we have left it in their power to begin a freſh war with us after a few years; and that we ſhall ſoon ſee them in as flouriſhing a condition as ever. Though they are not excluded from the fiſhery, yet their liberty of fiſhing, compared with what it was before the war, is ſo curtailed, that they muſt ſuffer a conſiderable prejudice. Surely there is a vaſt difference between their having *Cape Breton*, and all the other iſlands in the gulf of *St. Lawrence*, on which to cure their fiſh caught upon their coaſts, and their not being allowed 'to exerciſe the fiſhery but at 'the diſtance of three leagues from all the coaſts 'belonging to *Great Britain*, as well thoſe of the 'continent, as thoſe of the iſlands in the gulf; 'and out of the gulf, but at the diſtance of fif-'teen leagues from the coaſts of the iſland of *Cape* '*Breton*.' Thoſe reſtrictions will be preventive of their carrying on ſo extenſive a fiſhery as formerly; and the poſſeſſion of *Cape Breton* and the other iſlands, with ſecurity upon all the coaſts of *Nova Scotia*, will give us ſuch advantages in the fiſhery, that it will be our own fault if we do not exclude the *French* from a great part of the foreign trade for fiſh. That *France* will commence a new



new quarrel with us, whenever ſhe can hope to gain by it, I do not in the leaſt queſtion; and had we retained all that we have taken, this would not have prevented it. If the ſituation of our own affairs, had warranted her expecting to make an advantage by breaking with us, ſhe would have done it, tho' ſhe had not been fully recovered of the wounds received in the preſent war: but when fully recovered of them, ſhe will not dare to do it unleſs our own circumſtances give the temptation. Let there be a thorough good underſtanding between the ſeveral parts of the legiſlature, and unanimity among our great men, ſpreading its balmy influence through the lower ranks of the body politick, to the preventing or healing of their diviſions. Let our miniſtry be ſpirited, refuſing to be the dupes of foreign princes, and diſcovering a determined reſolution properly to reſent, not only real injuries, but meer indignities offered ſolely with the view of trying their courage. Let individuals move in their own ſphere, and each obſerve to keep the ſtation he is poſted in by his birth, rank, and character. Let principles of œconomy be adopted, government ſine-cures be annihilated, expenſive perquiſites be reduced, luxuriant penſions (given for vote and intereſt, and not the rewards of real merit) undergo a good lopping, and the extravagant profits of places be brought within due bounds. Let us not live up to the income of our common eſtate, but remember how deeply the ſame is mortgaged, and apply

ply ourſelves to the leſſening the incumbrance, that poſterity may think of us with gratitude, and revere our memories. Let us attend to the improving our new acquired or recovered territories, by planting colonies and enlarging our trade, that ſo the ſuperfluous hands thrown in upon the nation by the peace, whether ſailors or ſoldiers, may neither ſtarve, beg, ſteal, or quit an ungrateful *chriſtian* country (which after having ſerved its turn *by* them, hath no further concern *about* them) to enter into foreign ſervice. In doing this, let us obſerve, to make a ſettlement one or more upon the banks of the *Miſſiſſippi*, and to enter as ſoon as poſſible upon the actual navigation of it, that it may appear we meant not to ſtipulate for rights which we intended to make no uſe of, and that future periods may produce no litigations by our ſuffering them to lie dormant. Let us alſo for the future maintain in peaceable times a more powerful navy than we have been uſed to do, that ſo we may not hazard being fatally ſurprized, as we had like to have been, when the preſent broil commenced.

Should this advice be followed, the *French*, let them recruit their loſt ſtrength ever ſo faſt, will not dare to ſtrike us, finding us ready, both in mind and body, to return the blow. But if, on the other hand, the artful practices of enemies, or the ungovernable paſſions of friends, ſow diſſenſion between the king and parliament, the jarring intereſts of different nobles and perſons of quality



lity hamper the adminiſtration; the important concerns of the public are neglected, amidſt the buſtling endeavours of the *Ins*, to ſecure their places; and of the *Outs*, to ſupplant them; the nation is divided into parties by the diſputes of the great; the ſavings, that ought to be made out of the revenue, are divided between placemen, penſioners, voters and mutes; no attempts are made to reduce the publick debt; the advantages we have gained are neglected; due care is not taken to be ready for a freſh rupture, and the miniſtry for the time being is afraid of it, becauſe of the oppoſition;—I ſay, if this was the caſe, tho' we were to retain all our conqueſts, our enemies would ſoon be encouraged to renew hoſtilities. Let us make a right uſe of our new acquired and recovered territories, and be true to our own intereſts, and we need not fear the power of *France* was it to return to its paſt meridian: and without this, it will ſhortly prove terrible to us tho' in its decline. But to draw to a cloſe. By the preliminary articles. We are to give back *Goree*, *Guadaloupe*, *Mariegalante*, *Deſirade*, *Martinico*, *Belleiſle*, and the *Havanna*. The *French* have their ruined comptoirs on the coaſts of *Coromandel* and *Malabar*, and in *Bengal* reſtored to them under certain limitations. *St. Lucia* is to be delivered up to them. They have the liberty of fiſhing and drying, on a part of the coaſts of *Newfoundland* as before; and under reſtrictions, of fiſhing in the gulf of *St. Lawrence*; and the iſlands of *St. Peter* and *Miquelon* are ceded to them, to

 ſerve

ſerve as a ſhelter for their fiſhermen. And then, we are to have no fortifications in the bay of *Honduras*, or any other places of the territory of *Spain* in that part of the world. This is the dark ſide, but inſtead of pouring inceſſantly upon it, and ſuffering it to engroſs our whole attention, till we loſe ourſelves in reſentment and are become ſplenetick, let us turn to the bright one. *Minorca* is to be reſtored to us. The town and port of *Dunkirk* is to be put into the ſtate fixed by the treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle* and former ones. The countries belonging to the electorate of *Hanover*, the Landgrave of *Heſſe*, the Duke of *Brunſwick*, or to the Count of *La Lippe Buckebourg* poſſeſſed by the *French*, are to be reſtored. *France* evacuates *Oſtend* and *Nieuport*, together with *Cleves*, *Wezel*, *Gueldres*, and all the countries belonging to the King of *Pruſſia*, and withdraws its troops from *Germany*. *Portugal* is to have back all that the enemy hath taken. We are to have *St. Vincent*, *Dominica*, and *Tobago*, three out of the four neutral iſlands, the iſlands of *Grenada* and the *Grenadines*, *Senegal*, *Cape Breton*, *St. Johns*, *Anticoſte*, and the other iſlands in the gulf of *St. Lawrence*, all *Canada*, and the whole country to the eaſtward of the *Miſſiſſippi* down to the gulf of *Mexico* (*New Orleans*, and the iſle in which it is ſituated excepted) together with the free navigation of that river. We are alſo to have the whole of *Florida*, with the full and unmoleſted liberty of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood.

When



When all theſe things are laid together; and I conſider, the lowering aſpect attending the war at its firſt opening; the uncertainty neceſſarily accompanying its operations; the additional acquiſitions we gain beyond what we ſhould have had, ſuppoſing peace had been made in 1761; the loſſes of *France* and *Spain*; our new acquired and recovered territories; the immence gains we make at the expence of our enemies; the wound that their fiſhery will receive in the gulf of *St. Lawrence* by the limitations attending it; the ample ſecurity we obtain for our colonies on the continent of *America*; the honourable manner in which we get rid of our *German* connections, the deliverance of *Portugal*; the deſtruction of the family compact; and that we ſhall be no more embroiled in diſputes about *American* limits, the right of cutting logwood, and a frivolous pretended *Spaniſh* right to a part in the fiſhery; I cannot but rejoice, notwithſtanding the conſiderable reſtorations made by us. I am compelled to congratulate my country, and am forced to cry out, How unbecoming is it! to murmur and complain, inſtead of being thankful to Almighty God, that our caſe is not what we feared a few years ago in 1757, nor what we have deſerved, nor that of our enemies. Let us bleſs, the Lord of hoſts, the God of armies, the Governor of the univerſe, that we have not been acquainted with the horrors of war but the joys of ſucceſs, that we have not loſt but gained, and that we ſhall retain ſufficient, if properly improved, to prevent

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the danger for another war for many years. Let us hail the approaching peace; and be careful that we blaſt not the bleſſings of it, by our own diſſenſions.

I ſhall now have done troubling the public with my thoughts, hoping in their candour to excuſe all faults. I have never troubled them in this way before, and ſhall ſcarce ever do it again. I have no intereſt to ſerve by it, but what is common to every individual of the community. I am of no party: have no acquaintance with the great: know the perſons of none of them, my ſovereign excepted: am in no place: depend upon the government only for protection in the enjoyment of the rights of ſociety: and care not who is *in*, or who is *out*, if public affairs are managed for the beſt. Should curioſity excite to make a more particular inquiry concerning the author, I have made proviſion for baffling the ſame, being deſirous of remaining

December 1762.

IGNOTUS.

*FINIS.*

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